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INTRODUCTION

The Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to provide
for copyrights.1 A copyright grants its holder the power to stop
other people-noncopyright holders-from saying certain things or
distributing certain messages. A legislative grant of this private
power to stop speech on the basis of its content is in overt tension
with the constitutional guarantees of speech and press freedom.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 makes clear that the First
Amendment not only prohibits many direct governmental restrictions on people's speech, but also applies to at least some government grants of authority to private persons to restrict another person's speech. What the government cannot do directly it sometimes
cannot do indirectly either.
Private power founded on general legal rules that themselves do not refer to speech pose a different issue. These rules often provide constitutionally permissible ways for private parties to
limit other people's speech. Granting private property holders
power to limit other people's speech, for example, while the others
are on the property holders' land, usually does not offend the First
Amendment. 3 Much more constitutionally problematic are laws directed at speech, for example, laws that give private persons power
specifically over other people's speech. These laws are aimed at creating in one person property or personal interests specifically in the
speech choices of other people. This problematic territory comprises
primarily First Amendment limitations on tort law, for example, in
the defamation or privacy context, where the defamed or privacyseeking person asserts a right to restrict others' speech choices.
This territory could also easily encompass some constitutional limits on the enforcement of contractual agreements to restrict speech 4

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
2.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3.
The Court's protection of speech in the company town, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946), is the exception, not the norm. Cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding no
state action in shopping center's restriction on speech).
4.
For example, CBS claimed that its primary reason not to broadcast an interview with a
former tobacco executive, Jeffrey Wigand, describing apparent perjury of top tobacco executives
in congressional testimony was its potential liability for inducing a breach in the silence provision in Wigand's separation agreement with the tobacco company. First Amendment concerns,
however, could lead a court to find the contractual term contrary to public policy and to refuse to
impose tort liability. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264-65 (1998); see also Bill Carter, Tobacco Company Sues Former
Executive over CBS interview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at A14. But see Cohen v. Cowles Media
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or on statutes that prohibit further communication of illegally obtained information.5 Copyright similarly empowers one private
party to limit another's speech. It potentially allows one private
party, A, to tell another, B, that she cannot say (or publish or distribute) specific content, for example, because A has already said it
(in a manner that was fixed in a tangible medium) or has bought
the right to say it from someone who had already obtained the
copyright. This Essay explores the constitutionality of granting this
power.
As an amendment to a document that previously had authorized legislation creating copyrights, the First Amendment could be
read to nullify the prior grant the way the Thirteenth Amendment
entirely takes away any earlier implicit authorization of state
power to establish slavery. This view of the First Amendment entirely displacing the earlier text is universally rejected, I think
properly, as to copyright. 6 Still, the First Amendment generally limits prior constitutional grants of power. The Constitution provides
that "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce" just as
it shall have the power to provide for copyright.7 Clearly, however,
Congress cannot use the commerce power to forbid interstate commerce in books. Likewise, the First Amendment can reasonably be
seen as limiting (although not eliminating) congressional power to
grant exclusive rights to author's expressions.
In any event, no analytic conflict exists between the First
Amendment and the grant of legislative power to Congress. To say
"Congress shall have power to . . . " is uniformly understood to
mean that it has the power to do something only by constitutionally

Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (5-4 decision) (rejecting a newspaper's claimed First Amendment
right to violate a promise not to speak-that is, a promise not to publish a source's name).
5.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). Publication damages as an enhancement of
liability for a nonspeech tort also raises this issue of private power over speech. See Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting enhancement and,
thus, limiting private power over speech).
6.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Taken out of context, some lower court statements might be read to go further and say that the
First Amendment imposes no limit on Congress's authority to grant rights in intellectual property. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[We held in United Video that
copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment."); Reimerdes,
82 F. Supp. 2d at 220 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court... has made it unmistakably clear that the First
Amendment does not shield copyright infringement."). Nevertheless, the Court should be understood as finding only that those valid First Amendment claims presented to it have so far been
adequately accommodated by doctrines internal to existing copyright doctrine. The current situation in copyright is arguably most analogous to obscenity law before Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), or libel law before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); namely,
the Court has not fully grappled with the extent of First Amendment limits in this area.
7.
U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 8.
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permissible means. The language, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom . . ." identifies one of the impermissible
means. The extent or scope of permitted authority (e.g., the congressional authority to secure rights for authors) is simply what is
left after the impermissible means are eliminated. Of course, specifying what means are impermissible in this context requires a careful consideration of the meaning and function of the First Amendment.
This hierarchical way of reading the two clauses, although
possibly the most obvious, is not the most common. The classic
commentators on the First Amendment and copyright found a presumptive conflict between the two constitutional provisions and
then proceeded to recommend resolution by a policy-informed balancing.8 At least initially I want to resist that balancing approach.
Conflicts between constitutional provisions should not be found too
quickly. A point made by Hans Linde in a different context describes the view this Essay will test. In the face of assertions that
free press and fair trial guarantees conflict, Linde observed that
both claimants have claims only against the government. 9 Although
honoring freedom of press might make it more difficult (even impossible) for the government to conduct a fair trial, Linde points out
that the two rights cannot conflict since both right claimants assert
only that the government not do something: prosecute without a
fair trial or abridge press freedom. If the government cannot conduct a fair trial while fully respecting freedom of the press, itself a
doubtful proposition, 10 then the government cannot prosecute. The
situation is no different from the government not being permitted to
prosecute if the only way it was able to secure the evidence neces-

8.
See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983,
988 (1970) (recommending a balancing approach and formulating two "accommodative principles"); Meville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1184 (1970) (recommending a form of "definitional
balancing"). Nimmer clearly placed considerable weight on the copyright side of the balance,
arguing that the First Amendment "does not legitimatize wholesale amputation in vital copyright areas" or a subsidy to copiers "at the expense of authors." Nimmer, supra, at 1200, 1203. Of
course, the subsidy language already assumes the legitimacy of the legislatively created property
claim. From a starting point of free speech, copyright could be seen as creating a subsidy for
authors at the expense of would-be speakers. In any event, these balancing or accommodation
methodologies can be contrasted with Thomas Emerson's "full protection" theory, or the approach explored in this Essay. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970).
9.
See Hans Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two Rights Against the State, 13
WILLAMETTE L.J. 211 (1977).
10. Justice Brennan thought it clearly false. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
588 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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sary for the trial was by violating the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. 1
Even if there is no logical conflict, the implications of full
protection of First Amendment rights may turn out to be extraordinarily destructive of the typical functions of copyright. Likewise,
our societal commitment to using copyright to support a better information environment may be deeply held. If these both turn out
to be true-and for purposes of this Essay I concede the second-a
balancing accommodation may be the only appropriate response.
Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume this conflict from the start. An
unwavering commitment to the First Amendment requires that the
first question be: What scope does a strict interpretation of the
First Amendment leave for copyright grants? 12 Only if the answer is
that this interpretation really leaves too little scope to be acceptable should a commentator proceed to advocate accommodations or
balancing.
Of course, the permissible scope of copyright within a full
protection theory obviously must depend on the appropriate conception of the First Amendment. Without defending the underlying
theory here, the primary contribution of this Essay will be to try to
work out the implications of what I consider normatively the most
defensible and often the most descriptively accurate conception of
the First Amendment-an approach I have discussed extensively in
13
earlier writings.
Both this First Amendment theory and this assumption that
full protection should provide at least the beginning point of discussion diverge from the classic treatments of First Amendment and
copyright. The earlier theorists relied upon a relatively undeveloped marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment. 14 More-

11. There are many reasons why a government, because of the necessity of recognizing constitutional rights, will be unable to conduct a fair trial. For example, if the crucial evidence in a
case was obtained by an illegal search or if it turns out that the only way to get crucial evidence
would be to torture the accused, the proper result under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is to
dismiss the charges instead of having a trial.
12. At the end of her review of an increasingly expanded realm of copyright propertization
of expression, Diane Zimmerman called for a new approach, suggesting that "we need to start
consistently from the other end, and approach all of these information cases with the question,
what room is left for private property rights after we have attended to the claims of free speech?"
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 740 (1992). Her advice is
adopted here.
13.

See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989).

14. Goldstein treats the First Amendment as basically a public interest in access to ideas
and information or, as he states the standard at one point, "free trade of ideas is compelled by
First Amendment policy." Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1022. Although Nimmer identified the
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over, in some cases, their assumptions about the First Amendment
appeared to be mere window dressing; their accommodation seemed
driven more by a notion of the needs of a copyright system than by
any careful consideration of the requirements of the First Amendment. Still, from the perspective of their marketplace of ideas theory, the theorists could be right to recognize that any copyright protection involves at least some restriction on the First Amendment;
any copyright claim prevents communication of some content that
contains ideas. Given this inherent conflict, balancing would seem
15
to be the only plausible response.
Alternatively, if the commentator emphasizes that a marketplace of ideas only protects communication of facts and ideas,
there may be no conflict, at least given existing copyright law. The
law distinguishes uncopyrightable facts and ideas from copyrightable expression. Copyright assertedly does not limits ideas within
the marketplace at all but only particular expressions of those
ideas. Thus, within a marketplace of ideas theory, this
idea/expression dichotomy, although often difficult to draw in practice, at least conceptually eliminates the asserted conflict between
the two constitutional provisions. 16 Of course, other commentators
observe, as did the Court in the "Fuck the Draft" First Amendment

broader range of First Amendment values emphasized by Thomas Emerson, see EMERSON, supra
note 8, Nimmer described the "marketplace of ideas" as the "most important objective" and found
the key concern was providing for "a self-governing people's participation in the marketplace of
ideas." Nimmer, supra note 8, at 1191, 1197; see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 290, 309
(1979) (emphasizing marketplace of ideas theory).
15. A recent marketplace of ideas theorist, emphasizing the ways the speech markets fail,
adopts this view and responds by recommending such a balancing approach. Rebecca Tushnet,
Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with AntiPornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2000).
16. This view is commonly asserted in court opinions, although never with any selfconscious reflection about the view's implicit reliance on one specific, contested theory of the
point or nature of speech freedom. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United Video, Inc. v. FCC,
890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Although the constitutional conclusion would presumably
change if Congress tried to statutorily tamper with the current rule that facts and ideas do not
enjoy copyright protection, this view quite logically led a lower court to hold that "copyrights are
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment." Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
Interestingly, Justice Brennan, who was once the most articulate defender of a marketplace of
ideas theory of the First Amendment, but who eventually adopted an individual liberty theory
(at least as a supplement that had absolute force when implicated), used this distinction to distinguish the restraints implicit in copyright, noting that "copyright laws, of course, protect only
the form of expression and not the ideas expressed." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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case, 17 that sometimes the idea cannot be disentangled from the
form of the expression.18 The medium being the message, that is,
the idea being intimately tied with its expression creates some inherent conflict between protecting freedom within a marketplace of
ideas and protecting a realm of property in expression. Those commentators who see this as only an occasional state of affairs often
hope to resolve the conflict by placing discrete limits on copyrighteither in the form of constitutionally inspired "fair use" defenses or
through a more explicit First Amendment privilegeX9-that would
allow the public to receive all ideas.
This view of the First Amendment, usually implicitly assumed rather than argued for, does not distinguish between the
source of the speech, whether individual or the press, but merely
20
treats speech as providing fodder for the marketplace of ideas. I
have argued elsewhere that this marketplace of ideas theory is fundamentally unsound both normatively and descriptively. 21 Instead,
the First Amendment should distinguish the Speech and Press
Clauses. Freedom of speech protects a broad realm of individual
expressive liberty. Speech freedom is an embodiment of one of the
most fundamental human values, the right of an individual to make
her own choices about the values she expresses. This notion of
speech freedom emphasizes the normative requirement that the
state respect a person's autonomy and not make paternalistic decisions about what she can express. This is the free speech right that
Justice Brennan has described as "inviolate;" 22 the free speech right

17. In Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court gave two grounds for its decision.
As noted above, the Court stated that "we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Id. at 26. The Court, however, relied most heavily on First Amendment protection of individual liberty, asserting that the First Amendment "put[s] the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us." Id. at 24. Noting that the "emotive function [of
speech] ... may often be the more important element ..." the Court further emphasized that
"the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual." Id. at 24, 25.
18. See Harper& Row Publishers,471 U.S. at 563 (noting that "some of the briefer quotes
from the memoir are arguably necessary adequately to convey the facts... [and are] so integral
to the idea expressed as to be inseparable from it").
19. See Denicola, supra note 14, at 304-06 (favoring a First Amendment privilege to avoid
distorting the fair use doctrine, which usually should not apply when the use could injure the
property holder economically).
20. "Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source .. "),with Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990)
(making the source of the speech constitutionally crucial).
21. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 13.
22. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 585 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Fireedom of expression is made inviolate by the First Amendment .. ");see also First
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that an earlier Court explained protected the child who refuses to
salute the flag. 23 That is, the Constitution requires respect for
individual autonomy and mandates protection of individual speech
choices.
In contrast, the press is typically a corporate entity, an institutional structure involving multiple people. Such entities are not
intrinsically valuable. Their value lies in their instrumental service
to human flourishing. Press freedom is not itself a direct human
value, although it may make absolutely essential contributions to
human values, including the values of freedom and democracy (and,
combined with democracy may even provide the best guarantee that
people will not be left without basic necessities such as food). 24 In
this view, freedom of the press should be interpreted in light of its
vital, constitutionally protected, but merely instrumental role.
The press's democratic role is central and is the feature that
most merits constitutional protection. Although this role could be
understood narrowly, under a reasonable conception of participatory democracy, 25 a free press should be understood to provide a
nongovernmentally-controlled source of information and vision that
people can enjoy and use in their lives. As such, constitutional protection serves roughly the same values as does copyright law or any
other aspect of properly designed, governmental media policy. The
two, however, serve these values in different ways. Intelligent media policy often requires the government to intervene appropriately.
The Press Clause advances these interests by protecting the press
from inappropriate government interventions. 26 Two observations
can be made quickly. First, the precise content of the Press
Clause-as well as the appropriate form of media policy-should
reflect a persuasive elaboration of the values they serve, especially
the highly contested notion of democracy. Second, a need for government intervention could be established by combining an understanding of the relevant constitutional values with a critical as-

Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting) (describing "the use of communication as a
means of self-expression, self-realization and self-fulfillment... and" as "what some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment").
23. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24. AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION
(1981); Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and Death, SCI. AM., May 1993, at 40.
25. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 125-213 (2002).
26. I do not rule out the possibility that the Press Clause affirmatively mandates some government policies or that the differences between ruling out policies and mandating them will
always be clear. The point in the text, however, is generally consistent with case law in this
country. Some other democracies, however, read freedom of the press to have more affirmative
content.
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sessment of the workings of a purportedly unregulated market.
Given the likely need for interventions as well as for constitutional
protection against improper government interventions, it should
not be surprising that judicial invalidations of "censorial" media
policies are common while invalidations of noncensorial media
"structural" policies are rare.
This Essay examines separately the implications of the
Speech Clause and the Press Clause for determining the permissible and appropriate extent of copyright. Of course, the two clauses
in the end may be doctrinally related in several different ways.
They might impose the same limits on the copyright power, reinforcing each other; or they might impose different limits, in which
case these limits would most likely be additive. Unless either the
Speech or Press Clause is interpreted affirmatively to require behavior by the government rather than merely negatively to limit it,
conflict between the requirements of the two clauses would be conceptually impossible. Still, in addition to being specific legal constraints on government, both clauses embody more general values
that are often affirmatively pursued legislatively. This pursuit
could be described as the affirmative First Amendment. 27 In this
affirmative aspect, the two clauses might suggest conflicting policy
decisions or even constitutionally informed policy choices that conflict with a specific constitutional restriction-for example, a copyright rule that plausibly promotes a more robust media that con28
flicts with an individual autonomy right.
II. SPEECH CLAUSE LIMITS ON COPYRIGHT
Freedom to speak presumptively means freedom to say absolutely anything one wants without any limit on content. (Limitations of time, place, and maybe manner purportedly pose very different issues 29 and are often permitted.) Moreover, this freedom

27. EMERSON, supra note 8, at 627-716.
28. Although my analysis is different, and in the end I find no conflict between the affirmative policies reflecting the values of the two clauses, my analytic strategy is similar to that of
Neil Weinstock Netanel. See Neil Winstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our
System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000).
29. The obvious argument concerning time, place, and manner regulations (or contentneutral regulations generally) is that the government must be able to use its resources to serve
public purposes. To do so effectively often will require restricting activities, including expressive
activities, that interfere with these governmental uses and, therefore, time, place, and manner
restrictions on expressive conduct must be allowed. The purpose of these permissible time, place
or manner regulations, however, is never to bar expressive choices-their concern is not with the
communicative impact of the expression (its content) but only the activity of expression. Moreover, some "zoning" in the form of time, place, and manner regulations might be allowed to fur-
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normally allows the speaker to address anyone she can get to listen
and maybe to approach the other person in order to speak, 30 at least
until that other person indicates that she is uninterested. An
(impermissibly) broad version of copyright overtly limits this right.
Even if the original text were written by someone else, a person
may want to quote the poem privately to her beloved or publicly at
the protest rally, 3 1 to give another person a copy that she has made
of a meaningful piece of writing, or to sing the song or perform the
play "owned" by another, or even to write down or copy the expression for her own personal use. 32 These are uses a person may want
to make of someone else's expression, some of which are currently
covered by copyright law and some of which are not. In each case,
however, the Copyright Clause might be read to authorize legislation that makes these acts into illegal copying. Legislation that did
this might even provide for the "speaker" being sent to jail. 33 In
each case, however, the individual's expression constitutes speech
from the perspective of the First Amendment. Absent some special
additional factor, any full protection First Amendment theory
should hold unconstitutional any such copyright-based restriction
on her expression.

ther public interests as long as speech freedom is not thwarted. Nevertheless, all three termstime, place, and manner-must be subject to careful attention in that each can itself be integral
to the expression. "Manner" regulation is problematic once one recognizes, with McLuhan, that
the medium is the message. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN (2d ed. 1964). "Time" and "place" are similar. Although city officials are normally permitted
some discretion over which parade routes to approve, courts have struggled to deny cities authority to prevent parading on a route integral to the paraders' message. Doctrinally, the judicial
concern with "adequate alternatives" might be interpreted to mean that no adequate alternatives
exist when the prohibited time, place, or manner is integral to the expressive activity.
30. But see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726-28 (2000) (upholding restraint on knowingly
approaching a person to speak for particular purposes when close to an abortion clinic).
31. Under existing law, the first poetry reading presumably is not forbidden while the second may implicate copyright holders' public performance right. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). However,
this Essay is concerned with both the reason why Congress could not constitutionally forbid the
first, and why any existing restriction of the second should be held unconstitutional.
32. Although a marketplace of ideas theory emphasizes the relevance of speech to listeners,
speech has many solitary or noncommunicative uses. These range from keeping a diary or singing in the shower to personal note-taking. From an individual liberty or autonomy theory of free
speech, there is no conceptual problem with seeing these uses of speech as protected. Copyright
law illustrates that sometimes government wants to deny protection to such individual uses. Cf.
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the copying
of protected work in order to create a personal library constitutes copyright infringement).
33. In 1997, Congress adopted the No Electronic Theft Act to amend the Copyright Infringement Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000), establishing criminal penalties in some cases of copyright infringement where the defendant had no interest in and did not receive any commercial
gain from the copying, thereby reversing United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass.
1994).
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Admittedly, this part argues for broader limitations on Congress's copyright lawmaking power than normally thought required
by the First Amendment. The above claim of unconstitutionality
may seem dramatic. Nevertheless, in actual effect, at least prior to
the digital age, copyright owners rarely invoked rights to restrict
usages that this part claims are protected by the First Amendment.
Copyright has never included a right to stop private "performances," for example. Until recently, whether because of the "fair
use" doctrine or because of copyright holders' lack of interest in enforcement, I suspect that few noncommercial copyings or even the
noncommercial public performances hypothesized above have been
subject to litigation. 34 Traditionally, copyright legislation did not
even apply to these personal uses. 35 This may be changing, however. Efforts to establish the illegality of private copying have become a major project of industry-based holders of copyright. 36 Here,
the constitutional reach of an individual's right of free speech could
become a major issue. Still, if my sweeping claim about the First
Amendment right to speak is not to be understood as requiring a
rejection of all copyright protections (and be summarily rejected for
that reason), it is useful to consider when people's presumptive constitutional right to speak does not apply.
Most importantly, the Speech Clause's protection of individual liberty guards a person's right to engage in the activity of communicating, not a right to profit from or receive economic return for
the activity. True, generally the law permits a person to engage in
an activity for money if it allows the activity at all. However, laws

34. Of course, threats of enforcement or fear of enforcement can create a substantial deterrent effect. Threats of suit by copyright owners can operate to stop copying that could be defended, but only at considerable expense and risk. However, I know of no evidence that such
suits and consequent deterrence of legal speech were common until recently in noncommercial
contexts.
35. In his historical review, Professor Patterson observes that federal statutory copyright
was originally designed only to protect an "exclusive right to reproduce the work for sale'-that
is, an "economic right .. . to print, publish, and sell." LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 194, 215 (1968) (emphasis added). In drawing lessons from this history, Patterson argues for limiting the "publisher's protection [to protection] against economic
competitors [which] would constitute a recognition of the right of the individual to make whatever use of a copyrighted work he desires, except for competing profits." Id. at 228. The economic
role of copyright was, as Patterson would again limit it, to protect against economic competition
rather than, as industry now wishes, to provide for maximum economic exploitation. Id. Patterson observes that the Court rejected a common law right of copyright by implicitly answering
"no" to its rhetorical question: "Is there an implied contract by every purchaser of his book, that
he may realize whatever instruction or entertainment which the reading of it shall give, but
shall not write out or print its contents." Id. at 209 (quoting Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 657 (1834)).
36. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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against prostitution make clear (putting aside possible equal protection challenges to prostitution laws) that this is not always so.
Similarly, a person may have a constitutionally protected right to
vote, but no right to accept payment in exchange for her vote. A person may be free to own and to give to another cultural artifacts containing eagle feathers, but not free to sell the objects.3 7 At least in
the post-Lochner world, constitutionally protected liberty does not
normally encompass a right to be free of constraints in market
transactions.3 8 Although doctrinally less clear, a nonlawyer or nondoctor should have a free speech right to give away her amateur
legal or medical advice or views, at least if her manner of doing so
would not cause the recipient to confuse her for a licensed lawyer or
doctor, but no free speech right to charge for individualized provision of these views. Indeed, charging (or presenting herself as a licensed professional) could be legally prohibited as practicing law or
medicine without a license. Of course, this claim concerning the absence of a right to sell one's speech is only a claim about the protection offered by the Speech Clause. An entirely separate question,
considered in the next section and answered in the affirmative, is
whether the Press Clause protects charging for expression if the
expression is offered to a general public in the form of a publication
or, maybe, a lecture, song, or performance.3 9
Freedom to act (e.g., to speak) and to alienate (e.g., to provide another with your communication) are direct aspects of personal liberty. In contrast, market transactions are exercises of
power over other people. Even given that the exchanges are voluntary on both sides, each side gets the other to do something that the
other would not want to do except for the other's instrumental use
of the exchanged item (money, object, or commodified performance)

37. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). More generally, the point is that goods not
only have value outside their exchange or market value but that sometimes commodifying the
good can reduce its human value. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES (1996).

38. The proposition in the text is uncontroversial; the controversial issue is whether the distinction between economic liberties and personal liberties, including freedom of speech, can be
given a principled basis. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to ConstitutionallyProtected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986) (offering a purported principled argument for the
distinction).
39. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (protecting right of petitioner, whose registration
giving him the right to sell individualized financial advice had been revoked by the SEC, to publish a newsletter that gives financial advice). Also separate is the matter of asking for a monetary gift, a speech act that is normally protected. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that soliciting charitable contributions is protected by the
First Amendment); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment
and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991).
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to get them to do so. 40 In an exchange, one person gets another to
act not by persuading her that her act in itself is desirable (which is
the way an exercise of protected expressive liberty typically gets the
other to act) but by offering payment. The seller instrumentally
uses an object, performance, or money as power over the buyer
given the buyer's preferences, views, or values, not as persuasion
that changes or adds to the buyer's views or values. These transactions are presumptively subject to legislative control, which properly determines the socially desirable forms of private instrumental
41
power.
Thus, my claim is that speech freedom is a liberty-not a
market-right. Freedom of speech gives a person a right to say
what she wants. It does not give the person a right to charge a price
for the opportunity to hear or receive her speech. Of course, if the
reason the government restricts the market transaction is to reduce
robust and diverse communications or to censor speech freedom, as
opposed to being a means to serve some legitimate policy (e.g., preventing medical malpractice or advancing the economic interests of
a copyright holder), the restriction would presumably conflict with
speech freedom. 42 Some marketing rights also may be integral to
freedom of the press, but I will put that possibility aside until the
next section. Nevertheless, a prohibition on a person's commercial
use of another's copyrighted material, unless the rule is adopted for
constitutionally impermissible reasons, should not be seen as an
abridgment of her speech freedom. 43 That is, copyright does not
abridge the Speech Clause when it restricts copying or distributing
for commercial purposes.
Historically, recognizing a First Amendment freedom to engage in noncommercial copying, performance, or distribution would
have left by far the largest portion of the economic value of the "authored" content in the hands of the copyright holder, thus ade-

40. It may be objected that my claim is often but not necessarily true. But in cases where
the party's behavior would have resulted independently of this instrumental use of the ex-

changed item, the regulation or prohibition of the exchange would not prevent the independently
valued behavior-it merely would prevent the exchange aspect.
41.

Baker, supra note 38, at 810.

42. See United-States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that the validity of a
regulation that restricts a nonverbal expressive act normally requires that the "government
interest [be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression").
43. This tracks central elements of copyright law in at least its early historical forms in this
country. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 195-96

(1991). Thus, Patterson argues that copyright should be understood as not limiting "personal
uses" at all, while "fair use" properly applies not to personal use but to uses by a market competitor. Id. at 193-96.
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quately serving the primary function of copyright recognition-to
provide incentives for creation and distribution of quality communications. Legal encroachments on this personal freedom are largely a
product of twentieth-century copyright law. 44 Surely the benefits of
providing protection merely against commercial copying adequately
justify having a constitutional grant of legislative power to create
copyrights. Thus, there is no necessity, internal to copyright, to interpret the legislative power more broadly in a manner that would
authorize violations of the Speech Clause. Whether particular
circumstances, of which the new digital environment is by far the
most important, put strains on this conclusion is a separate issue
45
that I tentatively address below.
The broad free speech claim is that copyright restrictions on
noncommercial copying and distribution of copyrighted works are
unconstitutional. The expressive liberty protected by the First
Amendment encompasses copying as a way of receiving or preserving personal access to speech and distributing copies as a means of
communicating to others what the distributor wants to communicate. 46 Both because this claim about expressive liberty may have
moved too fast and because the digital environment may justify rethinking some free speech conclusions, I will evaluate a counterargument to my constitutional conclusion and consider two contexts
in which its applicability may be called into question. In the end, I
reject the counterargument, tentatively agree with the propriety of
restrictions in the first, limited context, and indicate a degree of
doctrinal and theoretical uncertainty about practices involved in
the second context.

44.

Id. at 195-96.

45. See infra Part II.C.
46. In many ways, this is the converse of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). There the individuals did not want to identify themselves with
particular speech content formulated by someone else and, thus, wanted to remain silent. Id. at
629-30. In the case of individually chosen distribution of speech formulated by someone other
than the distributor (namely, the copyright holder), the opposite is the case: she does want to
identify herself with someone else's speech. In both cases, the First Amendment should protect
the person wanting to choose the communication to which she asserts allegiance or agreement.
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III. THREE POSSIBLE COPYRIGHT-RELEVANT RATIONALES
FOR RESTRICTING SPEECH FREEDOM

A. No Right to Use Another's Property
Someone defending a largely unrestricted domain for copyright might argue: People have an undoubted right of free speech,
but this right clearly does not extend to a right to stand on someone
else's property to speak. Although a person can always communicate her thoughts using her own expressive formulations, when she
uses another person's words for her expressive purposes, and when
that word combination is legally recognized as the other's property,
her action is like speaking while standing on the other's land-or
worse, it is like stealing the other person's Mercedes. The First
Amendment does not protect such disregard for another's property.
Two responses, the first doctrinal and the second more theoretical, answer this argument. First, in the copyright context, the
First Amendment claim is not that one private person, a speaker,
has a right to use the copyright holder's property. Rather, the claim
is about starting points. The question is whether the First Amendment restricts the government's authority to recognize something
as a stick within some piece of property. 47 This is why the First
Amendment critique of copyright invokes New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan48 as the most relevant analogy. That case shows that, at
least sometimes, the First Amendment does restrict the government's authority to recognize private rights in speech content. The
Court held that Sullivan had no right to stop or receive damages for
the New York Times's false speech about him (assuming the falsehood was made without "actual malice"). Doctrinally, the First
Amendment restricts the government's power to recognize one
party's (e.g., the libeled person or the copyright holder) private
property in someone else's (e.g., the libeler or the purported copyright infringer) speech content.

47. The common failure to see this may reflect the tendency of some defenders of an extensive scope for copyright to unreflectively presuppose a natural law property right in expressive
creations despite the clarity of the constitutional language and the Court decisions emphasizing
that copyright is recognized for pragmatic reasons serving the public interest in a robust communications sphere. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545
(1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Interestingly,
the best interpretation of John Locke, the theorist most often invoked to support a natural law
theory of intellectual property, may show that he would recognize no such natural right. Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
48.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Creating property in land has only an incidental effect of
limiting someone else's speech. Its purpose is not to restrict speech.
Rather it only restricts speech to the extent that it gives a person
the power to keep someone off her land, thereby potentially silencing the person who wants to stand on the owner's land to deliver
her harangue. The power the law gives the property owner does not
turn on the content of the other's speech. In contrast, defamation
and copyright present relevantly similar contexts. For both, the legal restriction directly and specifically aims at controlling speecheither false, negative speech (defamation) or already-said speech
(copyright). Doctrinally, both are content-based limitations on
speech. 49 The law bars a person from saying, duplicating, or distributing some specific content that she wants to say, duplicate, or
distribute. Unlike the land owner who can throw off her land any
speaker or nonspeaker she chooses irrespective of the intruder's
speech content, the person claiming libel or copyright violation
must identify specific offending speech content of the defendant before invoking the law. The person is told, "You can speak but you
must say something else!" Doctrinally, strict scrutiny might apply, 50
although I agree with Justice Kennedy that normally censorious
content-based legal restrictions on individual speech that do not fall
into any unprotected category are, without more, unconstitutional.5 1
In any event, it is doubtful that the market incentive concerns behind copyright are the type of compelling governmental interests
that cannot be served by less restrictive means. In other words,
copyright should flunk strict scrutiny at least if the strict scrutiny
52
language is to be taken seriously.

49. This conclusion is taken up much more extensively below. See infra text accompanying
notes 79-117.
50. Interestingly, Justice Brennan's opinion in Sullivan, like Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), explained why the First Amendment protected
the speech. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70. Having done that, neither opinion exhibited any con-

cern with whether the admitted state interests outweighed the speech right, as would be required if the Court was "balancing," considering "accommodations," or engaging in "strict scrutiny." Instead, both opinions merely concluded that, given that the law restricted important First
Amendment protected speech, the state law must fall. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50-51;
Sullivan, 376, U.S. at 269-70.
51. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting to application of strict scrutiny and tracing how it accidentally made its way into Supreme Court doctrine).
52. I have criticized the descriptive accuracy and normative appeal of a strong presumption
against content-based regulation. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting:Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57. This critique, however, does not deny the
invalidity of content-based limitations on the speech choices of individuals.
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More theoretically, one person's use of land (or other material goods) for her purposes can interfere with another person's use
of the same land. The legal order necessarily provides some basis
for resolving this potential conflict. Strength or force, first come,
agreement or custom, greatest need, and/or greatest merit are possible bases for resolution-but so too is private property.5 3 A government choice to delegate decisionmaking to a single person is often sensible, although it is not an inevitable choice. For example,
the government could recognize a commons or some form of collective ownership in some or all land. Moreover, such a decision to recognize private property in land or objects has nothing to do with
trying to stop speech, even if stopping some speech will be one of its
consequences (and even though this choice, like each of the others,
is also likely to facilitate some speech that would not occur under
an alternative choice about how to allocate authority). Any legal
regime relating to land, wealth, or other objects that cannot be used
by two people for conflicting purposes at the same time will deny
speech opportunities to some persons, although normally not the
same persons in each regime. In other words, some form of ordering
is necessary and any form of ordering will have at least the incidental effect of limiting some speech. There is no way not to restrict
speech.
This ordering quality of land and material objects does not
apply to so-called intellectual "property." Intellectual property's
commonly observed public goods quality-namely that use of intellectual property is "nonrivalrous"-means that neither creating a
monopoly in one person, even if economically justified, nor creating
any other legal allocation is conceptually necessary. Law must determine the method for identifying who gets to make a decision
about the use of a particular piece of land or an object at any particular time, but need not decide who gets to say or print particular
words. Nothing conceptually prevents everyone, without conflict,
from saying the same thing, even at the same time (although it
might get quite noisy!). This fact makes the possibility of a First
Amendment challenge to legislative or common law property rights
that restrict speech much different in the cases of intellectual and
physical property. At most, a person might generate an (almost inevitably losing) O'Brien-type54 challenge to content-neutral rules
limiting her use of someone else's land or material objects for her

53. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711 (1980).
54. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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speech. In contrast, recognizing monopoly rights to say and communicate (distribute) particular word combinations (or their derivatives) that an original author first fixed in a tangible medium directly, and conceptually unnecessarily, and hence probably unconstitutionally, restricts other persons' speech choices. Of course, significant policy arguments may support recognizing private property
rights in both cases. But in the case of intellectual property, the
lack of necessity and the direct targeting of speech should combine
to be constitutionally fatal to the legal restriction when it abridges
speech freedom. The practical arguments purportedly favoring the
property rule need fare no differently than they do in any cases
where speech freedom is restricted for instrumentally valuable reasons.
B. Intentional Harms Without Mental Intermediation
Assume, possibly for the reasons described above, that free
speech principles generally require that a person be able to use
other people's copyrighted content within her personal, noncommercial expressive activities. That conclusion does not end the
story. Particular individual uses of copyrighted material might still
be denied protection just as other particular speech acts, 55 like perjury, fraud, making disruptive noise at a meeting, or speech constituting a criminal attempt, 56 do not receive protection. Identifying
these uses must proceed by looking at particular contexts and seeing whether and why protection should be denied. Since endless
possible contexts could be examined, the observations here will inevitably be incomplete. Nevertheless, to be illustrative, in this section I consider one, and in the next section consider a second,
slightly different, stylized, noncommercial use of speech. Each involves problems that, even if they posed some threat to copyright
holders' commercial interests in the predigital, pre-online world,
could be much more serious in the digital online environment.

55. I use "speech act" merely to refer to a particular instance of speech. This usage should
not be confused with a tradition of distinguishing expression and action, with the First Amendment only protecting the former. Elsewhere, I have argued that many of the conclusions within
this tradition, especially as elaborated by Thomas Emerson, are correct but that the distinction
itself is misleading, largely indicating the conclusion rather than aiding the analysis. BAKER,
supra note 13, at 70-73.
56. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hans A. Linde, Clear and Present Danger
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970). Requiring
that there be an intent to cause a crime, and that effort is rather close to succeeding, is roughly
the content of a criminal attempt.
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Moreover, each involves situations where the First Amendment expressive claim might be especially weak.
First, suppose that someone ideologically opposes property in
intellectual content or dislikes a particular copyright holder. For
these or other reasons, she might take direct action, copying and
making freely available someone else's copyrighted content specifically in order to undermine its commercial value. Perhaps, her expressive act may even be considered political-she expresses her
opposition to intellectual property. In any event, the copier has
merely engaged in expression or communications and she generally
has a First Amendment right to express either opposition to intellectual property or even her dislike of a particular person. The
question is whether she has a right to express those attitudes in
this way, with this behavior. That her behavior clearly does and is
intended to express values or a viewpoint is never sufficient to justify constitutional protection. The means matter. A person can express negative views about the President, but not by assassinating
him. Unlike publicly tearing up one's copy of the Constitution in
"eloquent protest to a decision of [the Court], ' 57 a murder, even
though expressive, receives no protection from the First Amendment. One consideration that may determine whether nonverbal
expressive behavior is protected concerns how it achieves its expressive effect-or, relatedly, why the government prohibited the
expressive behavior. The same point applies to verbal behavior.
How verbal behavior achieves its effect can determine whether it is
protected. A person can permissibly use the persuasiveness or
charm of her own words to undermine another speaker's expressive
efforts. On the other hand, the First Amendment does not protect
her undermining the other's speech by shouting so loudly and repetitively that the audience cannot hear.
Communications protected by the First Amendment generally operate through what might be called "mental intermediations." Rather than achieving their goal by making sufficient noise
to drown out the other's speech or by ruining the other's solitude,
their goal is achieved only through the expression being comprehended by the other. Protected expression also typically has a second quality. The communication is consistent with respect, not necessarily for the listener's character-the speaker can say that the
listener is a low-down, no-good scoundrel-but with recognition of
or respect for the listener's agency. The speaker assumes that the

57.

Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 454 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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listener can intelligibly assimilate the message, can comprehend
the information or attitude of the communicated message, and will
then react accordingly. Trying to achieve one's goal by informing
(even if the information concerns the speaker's contempt for the
recipient), by pleasing, by comforting, or by convincing the recipient
are all means consistent with viewing the other as an agent whose
autonomy the expressive act respects, at least in form. The other
can accept or reject, can be moved or repulsed by, can say "yes" or
"no" to the message.
A longer discussion would be needed to justify the claim, but
the failure to have this quality of respecting the listener's agency is
central to why intentional falsehoods, designed instrumentally to
get behavior from the listener that the speaker expects the listener
would not choose if the listener were properly informed, are generally not protected by the First Amendment.5 8 With lies, the speech
operates by tricking the other, purposefully undermining the
other's capacity for successfully autonomous acts. The lie treats the
other purely instrumentally. Although both persuasion and lies aim
at influencing the listener's behavior or attitudes, the first does so
while respecting, and the second by purposefully manipulating and
undermining, the other's autonomy. First Amendment respect for
autonomy generally requires protection of the self-expression that
the speaker views as a substantive embodiment or enactment of her
values-including her expressions of hostility as well as affection.
But even more overtly than the case of lying, the First Amendment
does not typically protect even expressive activities where the activity achieves the speaker's goals through means independent of any
message that the speaker wants to express or communicate.
In distributing copies for the reasons hypothesized above,
the "speaker" hopes to achieve her desired result of injuring the
copyright holder or the copyright system not by informing or convincing the recipients of anything, that is, not through mental
intermediations. Rather, the desired result, economic injury to the

58. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Brennan explained the point
more fully in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (describing the "lie" as "an effective
political tool," but arguing that "the known lies as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which ... change is to be effected"); see
also IMMANUAL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 48 (L. Beck trans., 1959),
quoted in David Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334, 354 n.60 (1991). This point covers many categories of doctrinally unprotected speechperjury, false advertising, fraud. The speaker's lack of respect for listener autonomy is central to
why a properly delineated category of blackmail is unprotected. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 6065.
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copyright holder, is achieved directly through substitution of the
"free" copy for the copyright holder's marketed version. This activity of "injuring" is most analogous to constitutionally unprotected
lying or to making noise as a method of disrupting a meeting in
that these activities are entirely unconcerned with convincing the
recipient of something that the speaker believes. Although a
speaker's "persuasion" of listeners not to purchase the commodified
speech in general nor the particular commodified speech of the disliked author achieves the same injury, the difference in means is
what causes this second method of causing injury to merit protection. The first act is analogous to torching the other's store; the second is analogous to a negative book review. In labor terms, the first
is analogous to blocking access, the second to informational picketing. Of course, eliminating the need for people to go to the "copyright owner" in order to access the content may also be the effect of
someone adopting the other's communications as her own preferred
message and distributing it. Still, expressive liberty requires that
this use of copyrighted speech be protected. The crucial difference is
that the copier's aim or purpose in these protected cases operates
through trying to be persuasive, not through directly injuring
someone's economic position. In many ways, defamation is analogous. The injury may be the same whether it results from an unprotected lie or a protected mistake. In the case of the mistake, however, the speaker was honestly trying to achieve her aims through
being informative or persuasive, not through using a tool to manipulate the listener.
C. The Moral Economy of Speech
Assume that a person makes multiple copies and noncommercially distributes them widely, but without any interest in injuring either the copyright holder or the copyright system. She has
no particular opposition to copyright owners or to particular authors and publishers making money on the copyrighted material.
Thus, this is not like the person in prior subsection. Her goals do
not involve intentionally destroying other's (economic) opportunities. Slightly different motivations for her behavior might be distinguished. She might distribute carefully selected content because it
effectively or conveniently expresses something that she wants
other people to know. Alternatively, like a librarian, she might instead distribute copies of many copyrighted items, even ones that
she does not herself inspect, because she wants people to have
broader access to whatever cultural or communicative materials the
world has to offer. Finally, a third possible motivation operates on
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the border between commercial and noncommercial. A person (or a
corporate entity) might freely distribute others' copyrighted content
because its wide availability will enable her to obtain some economic advantage. For example, wide distribution of communications could enable the distributor to make money through selling
services or machines related to the distributed content. This interest was the original business plan of the early commercial actors
engaged in radio broadcasting. Radio manufacturers broadcast (or
paid for the broadcast) of music with the hope that its (free) availability would lead people to buy radios. I will put this third possibility aside, however. I doubt that narrowly crafted regulation of this
essentially commercial behavior-as opposed to restricting the protected right of recipients to access or even retain copies of the mate59
rial thus distributed-poses any serious constitutional problems.
On first analysis, making expression available out of a desire
that others see, hear, or view it is merely an exercise of communicative freedom-the speech activity that the First Amendment protects. Speakers often try to widely distribute expressive content to
which they are committed. Even when the person makes multiple
copies available without endorsing (or maybe even inspecting) the
content, the activity and motivation resembles those which lie behind either governmental or private benevolent support for free
public libraries. The distributor-copier substantively values her
communications activity. Although these communicative activities
could reduce the economic gain to the creator or copyright owner,
the degree of reduction is an empirical matter. Historically, the expense of making copies and of distributing them may have resulted
in this noncommerical activity being self-limiting. Even without
legal prohibitions, this type of noncommercial distribution probably
only caused marginal injuries to copyright owners' economic interests.
This self-limiting quality of distributing copies may apply
much less in the virtually costless world of making digital copies
available online. Obviously, this new situation poses empirical
questions. History warns that the damage to commercial interests
may turn out to be much less than originally feared. In the past,
media enterprises worried that the ease of VCRs, audiotape copying, and photocopying (or even the existence of public libraries)

59. I move quickly here because I do not want to divert the discussion into a full analysis of
the Napster litigation. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, these comments suggest a view that Napster's behavior may be properly subject to
legal control but not on the basis that the court of appeals found persuasive.
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would undermine the value of various domains of copyright. The
reality has been much less dramatic. Sometimes, new, threatening
technologies turned out to be beneficial to the rights-holders by creating new marketing opportunities. Resistance to online receipt of
communication products among some people, a culture of voluntary
payments, or entirely new strategies for exploiting intellectual
creations may prevent the feared result-the demise of an economic
incentive for the commodified distribution of intellectual products.
Even with such a demise, however, the doomsday forecast of a collapse of economic support for creative talent may not pan out. For
instance in music, new methods of distribution may merely reconfigure which musical talents are most advantaged-possibly creating a broader and more egalitarian distribution of rewards for musicians as the changed environment results in payment coming
largely through means other than sale of copies, especially through
payments for live performances. 60 In fact, if digital distribution results in less money being spent on the services of middlemen and if
people continue to spend roughly the same amount on cultural
products, the resources going to cultural creators and performers as
a group could increase greatly. Still, the possibility looms large that
unregulated copying in the digital world will eliminate the vast
bulk of the economic value of whole categories of copyrighted material.
Of course, the First Amendment claim being considered is a
normative one. The claim is that copyright protection should not be
allowed to interfere with substantively valued (noncommercial)
speech. On the analysis above, the noncommercial copying and distributions should apparently be permitted despite its incentive consequences within the digital world. Still, in characterizing a practice, there is always a question of when a change in degree amounts
to a change in relevant kind.

60. I thank Yochai Benkler and Diane Zimmerman for observations on this point. See also
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 85, 127-28. Note that the result
might also be, in some contexts, to reduce the inefficient incentives of an existing a winner-takeall-type market-namely, an economically wasteful attempt of too many talented people trying to
become a star musical performer. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE
WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995); Michael Madow, Private Ownershipof PublicImage: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 205-25 (1993). However, the effects on professional talent in some arenas of the creative world, most obviously those that do not produce
performance income or its equivalent, may be more dire, while in other arenas of the music industry, new opportunities for creative successes become available. Certainly, there is no natural
scheme that demonstrates why those advantaged under the current regime merit more concern
than those that would be advantaged in an alternative legal/market structure.
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Whether the drastic reduction in the costs of communication
should have constitutional implications is curiously unexplored terrain. Arguably, the "moral economy" of speech freedom developed
in, and has relied upon, contexts where costs existed for the speaker
in some very rough approximation to the costs the speaker normally
imposed directly on others by her expressive activity. Although the
First Amendment protected the speaker's right to go door-to-door
despite the "cost" (in terms of time or annoyance to the householder), 61 householders were somewhat "protected" from an excess
of burden due to the speaker's "cost" (in terms of time and effort).
The cost of paper, ink, and postage continue to limit even mass
mailings. These costs gave some grounds to expect that the right of
free speech would not be too greatly "abused." Listeners would not
be overly burdened very often. Of course, listeners may be inconvenienced when large numbers of people around the country are so
seriously dissatisfied with existing conditions that they are willing
to put lots of time, effort, or other resources into protest communications-but in such circumstances, any democratic commitment
suggests that it is socially desirable that their dissent be registered
effectively and dramatically despite the burden it places on audiences. If, however, these facts about costs change dramatically,
maybe free speech principles should adjust. In fact, precisely this
adjustment may already be at work in a number of so far unrationalized doctrinal areas.
Consider, first, 1,000 people scattered around the city, leaning on lamp posts and each holding a picket sign with a message of
protest or support for some political candidate; next, consider the
same signs attached to 1,000 lamp posts in roughly the same locations. The impact on "aesthetics" within a community of these two
expressions should be, at any given moment, basically the same
(unless the viewers do not like the looks of protestors, in which case
the first is the bigger aesthetic problem). However, the cost (in dollars or in time and commitment) to the communicators of having
such a sign appear for twenty-four hours a day for many days at
numerous locations is substantially different depending on whether
the signs need to be held by a cadre of individuals or are attached to
lamp posts. A rough democratic or egalitarian relation between the
number of signs held and the number of people committed to holding the signs supports the free speech right in the first case but provides a much weaker argument for being able to post the signs.

61.

Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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Even if freedom of speech is understood to mean that members of
the commu'nity who do not wish to be bothered are required to bear
the cost of receiving the speech when the signs are hand held, it is
less clear that it should mean this when the burden is more onesidedly placed on the recipients. Thus, the Court has upheld some
bans on posted signs. 62 Or consider phone solicitation. Free speech
probably protects, maybe subject to time or manner regulations, the
right to solicit people in the home over the phone. But is it so obvious that this right applies to calls made by a calling machine that,
once programmed, can call thousands of people without further
63
speaker involvement?
These examples illustrate that a hazy moral economy may be
implicit in traditional notions of speech freedom, which under prior
technological conditions did not need articulation. The Court has
often invalidated regulations aimed at reducing or eliminating a
cost the speech imposed on nonspeakers-like rules against leafleting where the leafleting causes litter 64 or rules against door-to-door
solicitation even though the solicitation annoys many of its targets. 65 Nevertheless, maybe these constitutional holdings apply only
if the speech itself costs the speaker something (in effort or money)
that is not dramatically less or different (in terms of use of time,
effort, resources, etc.) than the costs the speech imposes on listeners or on the community.
The distinction above may be comparable to a distinction between behavior that affects the world "additively" and "determinatively." The social and cultural world properly reflects the aggregation of the behavioral choices valued by its members. This anarchic
summation of unregulated individual choice describes an implicitly
democratic conception of culture. Behavioral "voting" allows each
person's vote to have a small effect on the final result. In this way,

62. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). Although this analysis provides a possible explanation of the case, my comments should not be
taken as an endorsement of the decision. The dissent was quite persuasive both about how to
evaluate Los Angeles's commitment to its aesthetics justification and about the importance of
this form of inexpensive communication for those who are comparatively poor. The later point is
one powerful reason to conclude that the considerations discussed in this subsection do not justify a First Amendment doctrinal change.
63. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding state regulation of mechanically recorded telephone
messages). The Court's suggestion that requirements for time, place, and manner regulations are
less in the context of commercial speech may also be relevant here. Van Bergen, 59 F.3d. at 1549;
see also Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1989); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
64. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
65. Martin, 319 U.S. at 141.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:891

it treats people much more fairly and equally than does majority
rule, where choices of up to fifty percent of the "voters" potentially
have no effect. The argument for unregulated behavioral choice,
however, is much weaker where the private decision of one or a few
persons "controls" the social world available to others. 66 One argument for market regulation reasons that effective competition typically compels all competing firms to introduce money-saving (that
is, "efficient") practices in response to their introduction by a competitor. During the New Deal period, this observation led policmakers (and eventually the Court) to accept the need for federal regulation of various market-oriented practices. Otherwise, the drive to
the bottom would lead each state to adopt regulations most beneficial to the financial success of its businesses even though people
would much prefer regulation and would willingly pay the higher
prices if it did not undermine the viability of local business. In this
context, a single state's decision to reject a generally desired economic regulation would determine the result-it would pressure
other states to conform due to an unwillingness to undermine local
firms' competitiveness. Essentially, the claim is that democratic
creation of the social world ought to occur primarily through individual choices that are anarchically or culturally aggregated. But if
the choice of one or a few would control or determine the environment for everyone else, honoring democratic choice requires collective (typically governmental and ultimately majoritarian) decisionmaking.
When the cost of a communicative practice falls virtually to
zero, individual choices can have huge consequences independent of
any costs borne by the speaker. When these consequences reflect
the persuasiveness of the content, this result is as it should be under a regime of discursive freedom. But when huge consequences
reflect the mechanics of the communication process, and when the
cost to the speaker bears virtually no relation to the costs imposed
on those harmed, it is not clear why society cannot choose to favor
the parties harmed over the party speaking. The traditional "moral
economy of speech" no longer applies. Protecting "costless" expression is no longer the material context in which traditional free
speech doctrine developed. For this reason, the structural situation
created by the new digital technologies might provide a ground for
regulation. If unrestricted multiple copying and distribution by one

66. I have discussed this distinction in various places, most recently in C. Edwin Baker,
Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979 (1997).
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person is virtually costless and occurs under circumstances where
the activity destroys virtually all market power of copyright holders
and if most people approve of the existence of copyright holders
having some market power, perhaps, regulation is in order. I am
uncertain. Likewise, whether this situation justified modifications
of First Amendment doctrine is unclear. The issue merits more
attention.
Without resolving the issue discussed above, several relevantly different cases might be distinguished. First, if a widespread, free, noncommercial distribution is part of a "string" discourse in which different people continually add to and thereby
transform the content, 67 the determinative versus additive argument hardly applies. The purported infringers' use involves more
significant costs, in terms of reading and thinking about content's
inclusion in the discourse string, borne by the person who originally
copies and by the usually limited number of recipients and added
discussants who participate in this discrete discourse. Moreover,
although the reduction of value to copyright holders may be real,
the particularized nature of the copying limits the negative effect
on typical commercial communicative activities-e.g., newspaper
publishing. Possibly the most probable empirical prediction is that
people who access this compilation and discrete discourse do so not
to get the original copyright holder's creation more cheaply but because they value this enhanced discourse. Second, arguably the
same conclusion applies even to massive noncommercial digital
"mailings" (and remailings) of specific materials individually chosen
by a person who wants to spread the content because of her commitment to or approval specifically of what is said or of how it is
expressed (good language, good lyrics, good visuals). Although this
case is more doubtful, at least this person is willing to accept the
cost to her reputation created by burdening people uninterested in
receiving her digital mail.
Third, the person who makes available large amounts of
more or less indiscriminately chosen content for virtually costless
copying (or other use) by other persons acts less like a speaker and
more like a new kind of library-say of a "Napster" variety. Given
that free digital libraries, with the help of search engines, can be
universally available and easily accessed, the "determinative" versus "additive" argument seems relevant. The person who copies ar-

67. See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1705 (C.D. Cal. 2000), noted in
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 357 & n.14 (1999).
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guably "determines" that all other people can have free access. Of
course, traditional libraries provide content in a somewhat analogous way. However, each geographically located, paper-text library
effectively serves a limited number of people. The library market
can itself be profitable for copyright holders. Each library must
purchase the copyrighted material, sometimes even multiple copies
of especially popular materials. Moreover, libraries only undermine
the nonlibrary market for the material to a limited degree. Many
people desire to own a published copy and, in fact, the library may
be a cog in the social process that encourages a desire for books in
general and sometimes for particular books that the library highlights.
Of course, allowing free digital libraries to post copies of materials without permission from copyright holders may be wise social policy. Constitutionally, however, protecting an individual's
choice to post wholesale without permission seems less a matter of
speech and more a matter of one person choosing to restructure the
social world into a free access rather than a market-based environment. Although the lobbying power of the copyright holders can be
troubling, 68 the choice of whether or not to allow this sort of copying
may still be a matter appropriate for legislative policy resolutionas, I will suggest in the next section, is often true for the evaluation
of copyright rules under the Press Clause.
From these examples, a first cut at free speech limits on
copyright might be the following: (1) a person has a right to engage
in copying for her own use and for individualized noncommercial
distribution; (2) she also has a right to distribute broadly at least if
the copied speech is embodied in a communicative activity that is
different than or goes beyond the use of the original author or publisher-a "transformative" use; (3) but this right to noncommercial
use does not include a right to copy for the purpose of injuring a
particular copyright holder 69 or undermining the intellectual property system; and (4) a much closer case is where copying and distribution, even if itself an aspect of the copier's communicative
goals, has the likely consequence of largely destroying, not merely

68. See generally JESSICA LITMAN,
PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET (2001).

DIGITAL COPYRIGHT:

PROTECTING
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69. Of course, there is a right to injure by using quotations that reduce demand for the
original work because of the surrounding content created by the copier, such as a negative review
illustrated by the quotations.
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reducing, the market for authorized copies of the copyrighted material. 70 In this fourth case, limitations on copying may be appropriate, but the First Amendment issue is not entirely clear. Theory
and prior doctrine appear to support the use. Still, this conclusion
may have been based on a moral economy that is less persuasive as
applied to a digital world. In sum, the question of how the free
speech claim should fare in the digital context of relatively costless
copying and universally available distribution needs more theoretical consideration.

IV. COPYRIGHT AND THE PRESS CLAUSE
The Press Clause protects the media for instrumental reasons: narrowly stated, to serve democracy or, more broadly, to provide an independent source of vision and information needed to
promote a freer, more diverse, more robust, and more fulfilling society. This protective role of the Press Clause might be conceived as
merely the negative, government-restrictive side of the rationale
that also leads to the affirmative constitutional grant of authority
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Of course, the
Press Clause also encompasses more sharply defined concerns related to predictable threats to this affirmative policy goal. Still,
given this congruence in ultimate aim and symmetry in mandate,
limits on government imposed by the Press Clause should only
rarely, if at all, conflict with legislation authorized by the Copyright
Clause. If a copyright rule really impaired the media as an independent source of vision and information, it is doubtful that the
rule would really be "promoting the progress of science and the useful arts."

70. Copyright expansionists sometimes assert that the purpose of copyright is to protect
against any significantreduction in the market for a copyrighted material. This view is inconsistent with the Copyright Clause and the early history of copyright. In any event, the premise of
this Essay is that copyright can legitimately protect a market in the copyrighted work only to the
extent that the protection does not infringe upon First Amendment rights. Often the most economically or otherwise most effective way to pursue some significant social goal is to restrict
speech. However, the longstanding First Amendment response is that the social goal must be
pursued, often less effectively, by means that do not aim specifically at restricting speech. See,
e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,
160-61 (1939). Thus, in the context of invalidating a conviction for desecrating a United States
flag, the Court explained that though the government's end of "preserv[ing] the national flag as
an unalloyed symbol of our country" was legitimate, it was "not the State's ends, but ... its
means," restricting the expression at issue, to which the Court objected. Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 418 (1989). Thus, the question of the content and extent of First Amendment rights
becomes crucial.
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Nevertheless, the comparatively greater specificity of the
Press Clause's limits on government justifies examination to see
whether it helps identify impermissible uses of the copyright power.
But what limits does the Press Clause impose? Any notion that the
Press Clause broadly prohibits all government regulation of the
press is a nonstarter. Everything from labor law and antitrust law
to contract and property rules amount to government regulation or
intervention into an otherwise anarchic world. 7 1 Although a claim
that the Press Clause prohibits media-specific regulation would be
more plausible, that view too must be rejected. Ubiquitous mediaspecific regulation is often at least useful, if not necessary, to enhance the functioning of the press. Such regulation has been common since Congress, in the eighteenth century, enacted especially
favorable provisions for mailing newspapers.
As a third try, consider a strong presumption against mediaspecific regulation-it must pass some sort of heightened scrutiny.
Now the discussion is moving into a descriptively plausible realm,
possibly with the quarrel being over precisely how strict the scrutiny should be. Turner BroadcastingSystems 72 apparently suggests
use of the O'Brien73 test. As a generic doctrinal approach, however,
a presumption against media specific regulation seems questionable. To paraphrase Justice Black, 74 it would be strange that the
First Amendment, which manifests concern for an effective and free
press, would place obstacles in the way of laws-arguably including
copyright laws-needed for such a free press to flourish. Rather, the
need for beneficial government interventions is predictably great
and urgent: to serve democracy's needs for both pluralistic diversity
and common discourse that are uncorrupted by either government
or market competition. 75 If this is right, judicially imposed burdens

71. Even though the argument is theoretically a nonstarter, corporate lawyers did not refrain from making it. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7, 20 (1945) (rejecting
claim that the Press Clause insulates the press from application of antitrust laws); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (rejecting claim that the Press Clause insulates the
press from application of labor laws).
72. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) ("Turner I"); see also
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) ("TurnerIT').
73. See 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
74. "It would be strange indeed ...if the grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government
was without power to protect that freedom." Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20. However, Justice
Black continues with a sentence that could be taken to suggest the propriety of limits on copyright: "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." Id.
75. James Curran, Rethinking Media and Democracy, in MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY 120
(James Curran & Michael Gurevitch eds., 3d ed. 2000).
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on legislative attempts to improve the communications order are
problematic. At least after the broader, media/civil-liberties coalition has won the cases involving overt censorship (an endeavor that
requires continual efforts and that may include attacks on the censorial aspects of copyright), the main parties asserting rights will
be media enterprises that are often more interested in profits than
in either artistic or journalistic merit. Leaving a relatively loose,
empirically sensitive judicial standard to be manipulated and
abused in the hands of corporate media lawyers and sympathetic
judges is a very questionable strategy for obtaining a freer and better press.
Much better would be a requirement that a challenger identify precisely the evils that purportedly exist in some government
regulation, not a general demand that all regulation be justified to
skeptical judges after having already been justified before a legislative body in which media interests were inevitably well represented. Thus, possibly as a first draft, consider as the constitutional
principle: The government cannot censor the press; nor can it adopt
structural rules that purposefully undermine or sacrifice the independence of the press or its capacity to perform its constitutional
role(s).
This judicial standard-or Press Clause theory and doctrine
more generally-could be applied to specific copyright issues. However, despite earlier assertions about the commonality of aims of
Copyright and the Press Clauses, it may be useful first to examine
the consistency of copyright as a general category with a robust free
press. (If not consistent, given widespread popular acceptance of at
least some copyright protections, the pressure would be overwhelming to craft some sort of "accommodation"-which in fact has been
the recommendation of most scholars who have considered the relation of the First Amendment and copyright. 76 Accommodation, however, fits poorly with a commitment to full protection adopted as the
starting analytic position in this Essay.) Obviously, the authorized
affirmative purpose of copyright-which could be described as a
purpose to promote an independent sector of intellectual content
creation-is fully consistent with and arguably is roughly the same
value as underlies the Press Clause. So all might be expected to be
for the good. Consistency exists on the level of ends.
Evil, however, can also exist in the choice of means. The
method by which copyright serves its proper goals might be charac-

76.

See supra note 8.
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terized as censorship. Copyright operates by allowing private parties (i.e., copyright holders) to enlist the government to stop some
press entities from publishing or broadcasting some content of their
choice. As in the case of the individual speaker discussed above, at
least at first glance nothing could be more censorious than to tell a
publisher: "You cannot write that-you must write or say something else!" To put the claim in traditional doctrinal terms: copyright appears to be content-based suppression of speech-a characterization that currently seems to lead to almost automatic invalidation. 77 Either this characterization must be rejected, 78 the constitutional objection to content discrimination must be modified, or
copyright must be seen as in tension, maybe in conflict, with the
Press Clause.
V. QUESTIONABLE CONTENT-BASED REGULATION?

Although the answer is not without doubt 79 and, in fact, I
will later suggest that different conclusions are likely to seem persuasive depending on the theory of the First Amendment a commentator adopts,8 0 my claim is that copyright laws involve contentbased suppression of speech in the simplest and most direct sense.
Looked at from the perspective of the speaker, copyright restricts
and is directed at restricting her choice of content. If content must
be examined to determine if a law is violated then the law is content-based. Copyright infringements depend on the content of what
the copier copies. A transgression occurs only if the speaker's (that
is, the copier's) content duplicates someone else's "owned" content.

77. Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 196 (1983) ("[E]xcept when low value speech is at issue, the Court has invalidated
almost every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century.").
78. The categorization of whether or not a law is content-based is consistently controversial.
Often, Justices who vote to uphold a law find it content-neutral while other Justices in the same
case who would strike it down make a good (to my mind persuasive) case that it is content-based.
See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 623, 677-80 (1994); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723, 742-43
(2000); cf. Stone, supra note 77, at 251 ("The content-based and content-neutral concepts are not
self-defining.... Careful scrutiny.., reveals an almost bewildering array of easily masked analytic refinements and distinctions.").
79. Probably the dominant view is that copyright law is content-neutral. See, e.g., Yochai
Benkler, ConstitutionalBounds of DatabaseProtection, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 588 (2000);
Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact
on the Internet, 16 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 (1998); Paul Tayer Lehr, The Fair Use Doctrine Before and After "Pretty Woman's" Unworkable Framework, 46 FLA. L. REV. 443, 460-61
(1994); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 47-54 (2001); Tushnet, supra note 15, at 50-56. But see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Copyright Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998).
80. See infra text accompanying note 117.
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Justice Brennan states a clear version of the traditional rule: "[Any
restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content
of the speech, is a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it. ' 81 Similarly, in finding that a ban on editorializing by noncommercial broadcast stations was a content regulation, Brennan explained that to determine "whether a particular
statement by station management constitutes an editorial ... enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the
message. 8' 2 Or, according to a standard formulation of the test for
the only other alternative: "[C]ontent-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to its content. They turn neither on their
face nor as applied on the content or communicative impact of
speech. ' 83 Essentially, the law is presumptively invalid when the
means the government uses to advance its aims-presumably even
good, nonspeech suppressive aims-is to suppress communications
on the basis of its content.
Moreover, even if someone were to argue that copyright is
not facially based on content, a second way a law can be contentbased is if the concern motivating the law involves concerns about
content.8 4 Quite clearly the whole (constitutional) purpose of copyright involves the judgment that copyright leads to the creation and
distribution of content that people value and that society is left
with less valuable media content without the law-that is, copyright has a content-based purpose, specifically good or more valued
content.
The Gay Olympics case might be cited to support a contrary
view: namely, that copyright rules should be treated as contentneutral.8 5 The Court upheld the congressional grant to the U.S.
Olympic Committee of sole power to approve any use of the word
"Olympic" for commercial or promotional purposes. (Interestingly,
this legislative distinction between commercial and noncommercial
purposes roughly conforms to this Essay's conclusion that restrictions on noncommercial individual uses would violate the Speech
Clause but regulation of commercial uses may be permissible, with

81. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
82. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984).
83.

GEOFFREY R. STONE ETAL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1323 (3d ed. 1996).

84. See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994) ("But while a content-based purpose may
be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content-based, it is not necessary to such a showing.... Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to
save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.").
85. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); see
Netanel, supra note 79, at 52-53.
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the ultimate conclusion depending on whether the purpose of regulating the commercial use runs afoul of the Press Clause.) In an appropriate context, I would prefer to criticize that holding. However,
even accepting the Court's opinion, reliance on it for understanding
copyright as content-neutral is unjustified. The majority never said
a single word about whether the challenged act or its application
was content-based or content-neutral. The majority did not address
the dissent's analysis of this point. Instead, the majority simply argued that the case primarily concerned commercial or promotional
uses of the term8 6 and that the law applies primarily to commercial
speech.8 7 It cited the Central Hudson test,8 8 which the Court uses to
evaluate and potentially approve not only content-based but even
explicitly viewpoint-based regulations of commercial speech,
thereby implicitly suggesting that the case may involve content discrimination but that the discrimination was not problematic in
these circumstances.8 9 It noted that the statute does not apply to
most noncommercial advocacy expression that uses the term
"Olympics." Finally, as to those noncommercial uses to which the
law does apply, the Court invoked the unfair competition rationale
of InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press.90 In other words,
the majority decision is wholly consistent with the majority believing the intellectual property that the statute protected was contentbased, but nevertheless constitutional because it involved commercial speech and a narrow analogy to unfair competition. Although
the Court clearly operated on the unreflective assumption that
trademark and copyright are generally constitutional, it nowhere
implied that trademark and copyright are content-neutral laws.
Thus, in any exploration of copyright that attempts to go back to
basic principles, the case should be taken as irrelevant for the doctrinal question of what is meant by content-based regulation.
Three, somewhat related, claims might be invoked to resist
the conclusion that copyright is constitutionally problematic as content-based regulation. Arguably, a regulation is not problematically
content-based: (1) if its apparent focus on content involves only a
concern with "secondary effects"; (2) if the law's "purpose" is goodthat is, if the law is not based on the government disagreeing with,
disparaging, or wanting to suppress some identifiable message or

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 536 n.14.
Id. at 540.
Cent. Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1980).
S.F.Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 536-37 nn.15, 16.
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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suppress speech on some identifiable subject (which presumably
copyright does not have such a bad purpose 91 ); or (3) if the statute's
goal and most likely "effect" is good-that is, if its effect is actually
to promote content that the statute apparently suppresses.
(i) The secondary effects analysis is routinely criticized. It
purportedly leads to bad results and introduces tremendous doctrinal confusion. 92 Still, as long as accepted, someone might claim
that it can be applied to copyright. The claim would be that the
government's concern is only with the negative effect of potential
copyright infringements on the original authors' incentive to create,
not with the purported infringer's communication; and that this
effect of the infringing content is a secondary effect unrelated to
any government interest in the message contained in the infringing
work. However, this argument has plausibility only due to the confused state of the secondary effects doctrine.
Possibly the closest analogy went the other way, striking the
law as content-based rather than upholding it because the interest
was only in secondary effects. The "Son of Sam" law struck down in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board9 3 is in
interesting ways the mirror image of a copyright law. While copyright protects the authors' financial interests in their works, the
"Son of Sam" law, designed ultimately to provide compensation for
crime victims, operated more immediately to deny certain authors
(namely, criminals) profits from writings describing their crime.
94
The state asserted no interest in restricting particular content.
The government could claim that its interest centered not on the
message but only on the revenue produced-a secondary effect of
the speech. The regulated speech held the capacity to provide revenue to serve as compensation, in Simon & Schuster, for crime victims or, in copyright, for incentives for authors. Even though the
"Son of Sam" law burdened the criminal author and copyright rewards the author, burdening only the infringing publisher, both
laws were adopted to advance these desirable "secondary" effects,
not to suppress content. Nevertheless, the Court had no trouble

91. This characterization could be challenged. Someone might understand copyright law as
premised on a romance with the author as an original creator and hence see the copyright as
attempt to suppress expression that implicitly makes a contrary statement about the author's
role. See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).

92. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-38 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment).
93. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
94. Id. at 118. The Court rejected this assertion as an adequate justification for the content
discrimination. Id. at 119-21.
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finding the "Son of Sam" law unconstitutionally content-based. If
anything, copyright is doubly content-based. First, like the law in
Simon & Schuster, its application requires examination of content.
Second, the ultimate concern of copyright is also the content-based
desire to promote the creation and distribution of presumably quality or "desired" content rather than the merely amateur communications that people would generate without an expectation of the
economic rewards of ownership. That is, copyright is a policy designed to promote the first rather than the second type of content.
Despite confusion about the secondary effects doctrine and
possible inconsistency in its usage, let me suggest a tenable way to
understand it. Where the "harm" or "benefit" occurs only through
an audience mentally assimilating the message, a facially contentbased regulation is concerned with communicative content, not with
secondary effects. When the harm occurs or at least can occur independent of anyone assimilating the message, the harm is a secondary effect. 95 This interpretation treats as secondary effects the
type of harms that concern the government in its time, place, and
manner regulations (which are typically unconcerned with any
mental assimilation of speech content)-and thus arguably explains
why "secondary effects" are subjected to the same analysis as time,
place, and manner regulation. It also explains the examples the
Court gave in Boos v. Barry,96 and its discussion there of its earlier
use of a secondary effects doctrine of Renton v. Playtime Theatres.97
In Boos, the Court explained that the "justifications [of the regulation of the location of adult theatres in Renton] had nothing to do

95. As I read Hill v. Colorado, the Court interpreted the statute to restrict everyone from
approaching someone arriving at an abortion clinic if the approach was to "engage in protest,
education, or counseling" no matter what the content of their protest or educating speech. 530
U.S. 703, 720 (2000). Under the Court's view, the statute not only applies regardless of the viewpoint expressed or the subject matter of the speech (e.g., to counsel about the need to provide
earthquake relief in Turkey), but in addition, the statute picked these speech activities without
any concern with the content of the speech. Rather, these activities of protesting, education, and
counseling were picked on the basis of the reasonable legislative judgment that, when an approaching speaker has one of these purposes, her noncommunicative conduct, independent of the
content she wishes to communicate, is more likely to be experienced as harassing and a nuisance. Id. at 719-20. That is, the statute protects against "potential physical and emotional harm
suffered when an unwelcome individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by physically
approachingan individual at close range .. "Id. at 718 n.25 (emphasis added). The Court purportedly believed that the law was directed at these harms related to the physical approach and
other predictable noncommunicative behavior, not at harms related to the content, and that the
law had no objective of regulating content even as a means. I am inclined to think that, if the
majority was right in its characterization of the law, which seems highly implausible, then a
secondary effects analysis could support its holding.
96. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
97. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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with [the] speech," that the goal had "nothing to do with the actual

films being shown

...

*"98

The Court distinguished between, on the

one hand, a concern with movie theatres' effect on the surrounding
community (a secondary effect) and, on the other, a concern that
depends on the movies' effect on its viewers or on their subsequent
behavior, for example, psychological harm to or violent incitement
of viewers (implicitly, a primary effect). 99 Thus, in Renton, the
Court implicitly believed the justification, for zoning applies even if
all the viewers sleep through the movie. The justification, instead,
relates to attracting people to the neighborhood due to those types
of movies being shown even though these people (as well as the
moviegoers themselves if they are asleep) may never see the movies
whose content makes the ordinance applicable. Simply put, there is
no government concern with people's assimilation of the content of
the communication.
If this understanding is right, copyright is not aimed at bad
secondary effects. Copyright's policy concern arises only because the
audience of purported infringers see or hear-mentally assimilatethe infringing content. If they did not-if they used the infringing
material to wrap fish-the receipt of the infringing content would
not (negatively) affect the market for the original content. The
feared "harm" in the copyright context is that if the audience assimilates the infringing content, then they will be less likely to
make a duplicative purchase from the copyright owner. The justification is concerned with the speech content and with people assimilating it; the government wants to reward the content's original
creator, presumably in order to promote creation and distribution of
such quality (economically valued) speech content.
(ii) In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld a statute that prohibited a person from approaching within eight feet of a person who
was within 100 feet of a health care facility if the approach was for
the purpose of engaging in various specified speech activities. The

98. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320.
99. Id. at 321. Quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), the Court in Renton referred to "those [restrictions] that 'are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' " Id. at 320. Confusion in the
secondary effects analysis occurs because someone might think that anytime the regulation was
justified not by the government's dislike of the message, but with a concern with its consequences, the justification concerned a secondary effect. Such an interpretation would apply to a
concern with the psychological harm to or incitement of the viewer (Renton) or with American
relations with foreign governments that were angry at the United States because of the demonstrations (Boos). Since the Court has clearly rejected this reading of secondary effects, "justified
without reference" must mean that the justification must not involve either the fact or consequences of people understanding the message.
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Court emphasized that "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message .. .
The concurrence similarly argued that "key to determining whether
[the Colorado statute] makes a content-based distinction ... lies in
understanding that content-based discriminations [are presumptively bad] because they . . . [disparage or suppress] some messages."101
The dissent is arguably persuasive on multiple levels. It is
easy to conclude that the Court not only was wrong to uphold the
statute but was also wrong to believe the statute, which protected
those entering an abortion clinic from being approached by those
engaged in "oral protest, education, or counseling," neither did nor
was intended to suppress or disparage certain messages within that
context. Still, assume that the Court was right on these empirical
issues. The majority's doctrinal claim that content discrimination
does not exist without government opposition to the message may
have been neither necessary nor even its best First Amendment
argument for its holding. 10 2 If accepted as a good statement of content discrimination law, however, the Court's conception of the
"principal inquiry" undermines the characterization of copyright as
content-based and clearly challenges my earlier characterization of
content discriminations. At best, I would be able to claim a lack of
clarity in the area.
As noted, the view in Hill is not the only understanding of
content discrimination. For example, in Turner I, neither the dissent, which thought that the "must-carry" rules were content-based,
nor the majority, which rejected that conclusion, thought "disagreement with [some] message" was needed to make the law content-based. The Court in Simon & Schuster nowhere suggested that
the content picked out by the statute represented messages about
which the government disapproved or wanted to disparage. It is far
from obvious that New York opposed speech that described past
criminal behavior. In fact, the Court was even more explicit. In response to the claim that "discriminatory financial treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends
to suppress certain ideas," the Court said: "This assertion is incor-

100. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (emphasis added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 291 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).
101. Id. at 735.
102. A better basis for the holding would be to characterize the law, given its interpretation
by the Court, as justifiable because it was aimed at "secondary effects." See supra note 95.
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rect; our cases have consistently held that "[iillicit legislative intent
is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.
Simon & Schuster need adduce 'no evidence of an improper censorial motive.' "o103
Thus, I hesitantly suggest that the Court in Hill is wrong (or
at least inconsistent) to look for government disagreement with the
message as a general test for determining whether a statute is content discriminatory. Rather, it would be right to hold that such disagreement is a sufficient but not necessary condition of a law being
content-based. As suggested by the dissent in Hill, the majority's
criterion might be more relevant for a different issue: to determine
whether a statute that on its face does not require any examination
of content should nevertheless be considered content-based because
of its purpose. 10 4 Precedent amply supports this more limited use of
the majority's inquiry. 10 5 This was precisely the relevant inquiry for
evaluating the facially neutral law in Ward v. Rock Against Ra10 7
cism, 10 6 the main case that the Court in Hill cited for its criterion.
This is also the issue effectively made pivotal under O'Brien for

103. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (citation
omitted).
104. 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Two informative points about the history of the Court's formulation, "because of disagreement with the message" or "content," are particularly interesting. First, although many
laws are struck down as content-based discrimination, this formulation has only been used by
the Supreme Court in ten free speech cases (according to my LEXIS search). Of these, all but
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (involving an injunction that prohibited
picketing activity within certain zones surrounding an abortion clinic), upheld the challenged
law or regulation, suggesting that this formulation is used only when the Court wants to find
that the law is not content-based. In fact, even in Schenck, although a portion of the law was
invalidated, the Court did not find the law to be content-based and invalidated it on other
grounds. Second is the context of its usage. Except for its original use in a case that the plurality
characterized as involving secondary effects, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976), the next four cases all involved laws that were content-neutral on their face (assuming
this is a fair characterization of Turner 1). See Schenck, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Turner I, 512 U.S.
622 (1994); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781 (1989). Then, the formulation was used in several cases where the Court wanted to
uphold government subsidy or expenditure programs, which might be described not as cases
where the law was content-neutral but as cases showing that content concerns are often permissible in subsidy or expenditure contexts. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569 (1998); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). That gets us to Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), where the majority was obviously straining to uphold the law. Of
course, not too much should be made of this history. The Court may have been making similar
doctrinal points in other cases but using different formulations of its test. Still, this history
should warn against making too much of this language as a general test of when content-based
regulation has occurred.
106. 491 U.S. at 791.
107. 530 U.S. at 719, 736-37. This is the relevance that Justice Scalia's dissent gives to these
criteria, namely that they were a means to find a content basis of a law that was in addition to,
not in place of, whether the law was facially content-based. See id. at 747.
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laws that do not facially involve an examination of content or even
of speech. In contrast, laws that facially make content crucial have
been considered content-based without more-without even being
plausibly aimed at speech with which the government disagrees.
Going back to Mosley, 10 8 the foundational case for the content discrimination doctrine, the Court explained that "[t]he central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it described permissible
picketing in terms of its subject matter."'10 9 In Mosley, as in most
subject matter discrimination cases, the unconstitutional content
discrimination did not involve any apparent governmental desire to
suppress the disfavored speech. In Mosley, all speech other than
speech about a labor dispute was suppressed-but surely the
government does not "disagree" (Hill) with all messages other than
those related to labor-management disputes. In League of Women
Voters, the government did not disagree with all editorials that the
noncommercial stations might broadcast. 110 If this critique of the
dicta in Hill is right, then copyright is not automatically saved by
an absence of government disagreement with the disfavored (infringing) message anymore than the law in Simon & Schuster,
Mosley, or League of Women Voters was. Copyright is content-based
because it suppresses the infringer's speech on the basis of the
speech having the same content (or, in copyright terms, sufficiently
analogous content) as that created by the copyright holder.
(iii) A third argument for viewing copyright as not contentbased discrimination is quite curious. Eventually I will reformulate
it, not as a reason for changing the content-based characterization,
but as a rationale for removing the characterization's critical sting
in some contexts. The argument relates to a unique aspect of copyright's justification for barring "infringing" content. Usually, a
regulation that suppresses content manifests an implicit view that,
at least in the given context, the less of the restricted type of speech
the better."' Although the Court often talks of content discrimination, many unproblematic government activities discriminate, that
is, differentiate, among contents in order to promote "good" content.
Consider public school textbook decisions, public library purchases,
or NEA arts funding. Arguably the First Amendment is best under-

108. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
109. Id. at 95. The Court continued: "Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school's labormanagement dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited. The operative
distinctionis the message on a picket sign." Id. (emphasis added).
110. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
111. But cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
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stood to distinguish between content suppression and content promotion,112 condemning only the former. 113 Of course, the point in
objecting to the Hill formulation was that suppression is bad even if
there was no hint that the government disagreed with the message
being suppressed. Thus, in cases such as Mosley, where the state
obviously did not disagree with all or most of the messages that
were prohibited bases for picketing, given that people generally
have the right to use streets and sidewalks for expressive purposes,
the content-based discrimination was used overtly to suppress
speech on the basis of content. Copyright might at first seem like it
is on the wrong side of this line-it suppresses the infringer's chosen content; this is precisely why I argued that it infringes the noncommercial speakers' free speech rights. Nevertheless, copyright
differs from typical cases of content suppression. It is designed to
promote the very content-but not the same speaker-that it also
suppresses. It suppresses content as a means of promoting the
original creation, and presumably the subsequent commercial distribution, of the same content. Its aim is to have more of the content
that, in relation to some speakers, it also suppresses. The question
becomes whether this good end, more specifically, this speechpromotion end, should change the analysis?
The answer might be "no." When the government suppresses
speech, the purported reason is virtually always to serve a good
end. The First Amendment is generally understood to forbid the
suppression of content not just as an end but also as a means of furthering good ends, presumably even in furtherance of the good end
of promoting more expression. Although criticism of the result in
Buckley v. Valeo"1 4 is rampant and although I too have rejected the
case's outcome, 115 as a general matter I continue to agree with the

112. Cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (distinguishing book removal from school library and nonpurchase of books).
113. The O'Brien test requires that the government interest be "unrelated to the suppression
of free expression." 391 U.S. at 377.
114. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down limitations on campaign expenditures). This is also illustrated by the Court's unwillingness to accept the "silencing' arguments that have been popular among academic commentators. Compare Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down an Indianapolis ordinance banning pornography), aff'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986), with Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) (critiquing pornography in part because of its effect of silencing
women). See also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (critiquing racist speech in part because if its silencing effects);
Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case
of PornographyRegulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989).
115. C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expendituresand Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1998).
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Court's central claim that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 116 Suppressing speech is not generally a permissible way to
promote speech. Of course, this assertion would be wrong in certain
contexts. At a town meeting, for example, the government can limit
the time any particular participant gets to speak so that there will
be time for other speakers-as well as rule some speakers out of
order because the content of their speech is not germane to the topic
under discussion. Still, as a general principle the government
should not be permitted to adopt laws aimed at suppressing First
Amendment freedoms, either as an end or a means, even if the purpose is good (as there will always be an argument that it is), including for the good purpose of promoting speech overall or improving
the quality of public discourse.
This assertion of a general principle may have been too
hasty. The deep instinct of some commentators not to find copyright
a form of content discrimination and the Court's own conflicting
messages about content discrimination should give one pause. My
suggestion is that in part the conflicting impulses reflect the logic of
different understandings of the basis of the First Amendment. If
"what is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said,"117 then the constitutional concern
should only be with overall suppression of particular content. More
generally, in a marketplace of ideas theory, the limitation on someone's speech, even on the basis of content, should be irrelevant as
long as that content is likely to be made effectively available to the
public. Moreover, if the suppression increases the likelihood of the
availability of speech with that content, as copyright purportedly
does, then, from a First Amendment perspective, the suppression is
not only permissible but desirable. In contrast, if the constitutional
concern is with individual liberty, that liberty is abridged whenever
a law tells a person that she cannot say what she would choose.
When prevented from speaking because of the content of her
speech, the law has targeted and abridged her expressive liberty
even if it has done so for some other, presumably good, end. If these
claims are right, then someone who adopts an expressive liberty
understanding of the First Amendment will follow the dominant
doctrine in this area and find any limitation on a person's speech

116. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
117. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1965).
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based on content to be content-based and at least constitutionally
problematic. In contrast, someone who (consciously or unconsciously) adopts a marketplace of ideas or related understanding of
the First Amendment is likely to be attracted by the view of content
discrimination offered by Hill. More generally, this market-based
theorist would find no objectionable content discrimination if the
purpose and overall effect is not to suppress but to promote content.
These alternative conceptions of content discrimination raise the
interesting possibility considered in the next section.
118
VI. CONTENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE PRESS CLAUSE

Remember the claim that the Speech and Press Clauses have
different functions. Given that the Speech Clause is concerned with
individual liberty, it would follow that when copyright regulations
come up against an individual's freedom to speak, the conclusion
should be that the regulation unconstitutionally regulates content.
In contrast, the Press Clause is instrumentally concerned with providing the public with a robust range of expressive contentroughly a marketplace of ideas concern. Thus, when the Press
Clause comes up against a content-based rule that is effectively designed to provide for more or better creation and distribution of vision and information, the Press Clause analysis should not object.
Two characterizations are possible here. Either the Press Clause
analysis could assert that this is not content discrimination or, arguably better, it could hold that this overt content discrimination is
benign and constitutionally unproblematic.
In decisions involving media structural regulation, the Court
has allowed the government to restrict corporate media entities'
speech (or otherwise regulate media operations) in order to promote
more valuable or more endangered expressive content. 119 These

118. This part draws heavily on Baker, supra note 52.
119. Media law is riddled with access and "must-carry" rules that have this quality. These
laws restrict or burden the media owners' ability to speak by mandating use of their facilities by
others, typically out of a belief that the others will bring perspectives otherwise underrepresented within the communications mix. See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367
(1981); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see also Children's Television Act of
1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303a, 303b (1994). Although sometimes not explicitly content-based, mediaspecific structural rules in the print arena have also aimed at promoting a more diverse and
robust communications realm-that is, they aim to promote content that the government fears
would otherwise be endangered. These laws range from postal subsidies to the Newspaper Preservation Act or to requirements that advertisements be identified as such and ownership information be published in the paper. Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). The most
dramatic sacrifice of an entity's speech freedom (the owner's control over speech) in order to
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holdings clearly seem inconsistent with the Court's unwillingness to
Mosley allow the government to promote favored content, even of a
subject matter sort. Note, however, that the Mosley case occurred in
a context, picketing before a school building, where individuals
wanted to express themselves and, thus, the Speech Clause analysis was appropriate. Despite Court protests to the contrary (e.g., in
Turner P20), surely these approved regulations in the media context
have been concerned with content. The government properly promotes the availability of content categories to which it believes the
public should have better access. The government's usual means
are to regulate uses of newspaper, broadcast, or cable facilities
owned by private communications enterprises. The result, in effect,
is often that less communicative space-less broadcast time or cable
carriage capacity-is available for the owner to present content that
it chooses. Importantly, however, the speech that the government
inevitably and knowingly disadvantages (e.g., speech of or chosen
by the media enterprise) is not disadvantaged out of any disagreement with the speech or even desire to restrict that speech. Rather,
like the speech of a would-be copyright infringer, speech is disadvantaged only as a consequence of promoting speech that the government thinks would otherwise be underproduced and distributed.
Again, as with copyright laws, the government hopes that the regulations make more or better diverse content more available. Mosley
would, but on one reading, Hill would not find this to be constitutionally problematic content discrimination.
The analogy of these media regulation cases to copyright is
overt. Copyright, like most structural media policies, restricts some
speech by some speakers-the would-be copyright infringers-to
favor other speakers, the copyright owners, in the hopes that this
will produce a better overall realm of diverse and valued communications. The hope is that copyright will even lead to more creation
and distribution of precisely the (infringing) speech content that

further other people's communications is to make a commercial facility into a common carrier.
Dissenting in Turner I, Justice O'Connor suggested that she saw no problem with imposing this
common carriage duty on cable operators for at least some of their channels. 512 U.S. 622, 684
(1994). Combining her group with the majority indicates that the entire Court was ready to impose on cable operators the duty to carry speech that they did not want to carry. Speaking for the
Court in Red Lion2Broadcasting,Justice White similarly implied that the government could have
done, but did not do, the same in organizing broadcasting. 395 U.S. at 389-90.
120. Despite the majority's claim that the "must-carry" rules were not concerned with content, the explicit statements in the law, quoted by the dissent, suggest that the dissent got the
better of this argument. Where the dissent went wrong was in concluding that this content concern should make the law constitutionally problematic. See Baker, supra note 52.
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copyright law suppresses. In substance, the government concludes
that the professional, high-quality communications that it believes
copyright stimulates are more valuable and add more to the communications realm than what is lost to the marketplace of ideas by
suppressing the infringer's speech. Of course, from the perspective
of individual liberty, speech-suppressive means are impermissible
even if maximizing valuable speech (as the government sees it) is
the result. 121 But from the Press Clause perspective, this aim is precisely the right objective, and particular means are not excluded.
The question from the Press Clause perspective is empirical: Does a
better and more diverse communications realm result from protecting an economic return, made available to some speakers by copyright, or by allowing opportunities for unrestricted commercial
copying? It is clear that the answer does not always disfavor copyright. The Press Clause determination should turn on the plausibility of that policy conclusion in relation to particular copyright rules.
This dual Speech Clause/Press Clause approach, though
surely more disruptive than the copyright bar will find appealing,
turns out to be not at all out of line with the historical role and
scope of copyright. Copyright largely developed not to give authors
complete dominion over some sort of intellectual creation, but to
provide enough incentives to promote creation and distribution of
intellectual products by preventing what might be described as unfair forms of commercial competition. Personal uses, for example,
were not even covered by early copyright legislation. 122 Expanding
the current scope of permitted personal uses allows all that the
Speech Clause guarantees but would not destroy (though it will
sometimes marginally reduce) the commercial value of copyright.
Thus, although these personal uses add greatly to speech opportunities and individual liberty, they would hardly eliminate copyright's effectiveness at serving its legitimate policy purposes. The
Press Clause-as will be further discussed below-might restrict
the permissible scope or form of copyright protection. However,
these limits will not be inconsistent with the underlying purpose or

121. Post's essay Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse makes this point powerfully. See ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 268-89 (1995).
Where Post goes wrong in his critique of Sunstein is that noninterference in the realm of the
press, which is itself necessarily structured either well or poorly by law, makes no sense. Sunstein's call for a New Deal for speech, on the other hand, with its strong analogy to the New
Deal's recognition that there is no prelaw conception of legal entities and property on which to
fall back, such that legal structuring is inevitable, makes considerable sense in relation to the
press but not with respect to individuals, whose structure we usually do not think requires much
legal structuring. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
122. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 35.
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method of copyright-in part because any such constitutional limits
will be serving the same purpose, making diverse communications
available to the public, as copyright grants are intended to serve.
These conclusions obviously depend on a particular interpretation of the First Amendment: namely, that the Speech Clause
concerns individual liberty and the Press Clause is instrumentally
aimed at protecting a democratically needed robust and diverse
communications order. Although controversial, this theory does a
lot of necessary doctrinal constitutional work outside the copyright
context and arguably does it more successfully than any other theory. For example, only this two-clause, dual-purpose interpretation
reconciles the issues around the appropriate interpretation of content discrimination described earlier. That is, it explains the constitutional objections to content discriminations (and suppression) in
the case of individual and nonmarket oriented speakers while, at
the same time, explaining the propriety of content-oriented policy
justifications for, and constitutional permissibility of, the similar
content-based discriminations in structuring the industrial order in
the realm of commercial communications. "Suppressing some
speech as a means" is inconsistent with speech freedom but often
not with the instrumental rationale of the Press Clause.
Speech freedom protects an individual's expressive choice.
The individual should be free to choose what to say. To tell a person
that she cannot communicate something that she wants to say directly suppresses her expressive freedom-just as does telling her
that she must say specific words authored by someone else that she
finds offensive, like a pledge of allegiance to a flag. 123 Her choice to
express herself by repeating or distributing someone else's initially
authored words (or to retain access to specific intellectual products)
does not lessen the fact that her freedom is at stake.
In contrast, media entities, typically corporate bodies, have
no intrinsic moral autonomy that the law must respect. The rationale for constitutional protection of the press is that aspects of its
freedom make absolutely vital contributions to democracy and to
society's need for an independent source of information and vision.
Here, censorship of ideas or information must be forbidden, and
laws that undermine the press's institutional capacity for independent action and judgment are constitutionally objectionable.
Nevertheless, government intervention is often needed to help create a more robust press. In media cases involving access require-

123. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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ments' 24 or mandated attention to particular subjects, 125 individual
liberty is not at stake as it had been in the Barnette flag salute
case. Thus, in these cases the Court properly approves laws that
compel speech that the media entity would not choose to present.
These legislative interventions aim at correcting for circumstances
that make media entities less likely to perform their democratic or
social roles. The policy rationale is broadly content related. The
government expects these rules to add diversity or increase exposure to otherwise underprovided content. In response to the citation
of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,126 invoked for the
proposition that the government could not require speech by a media entity, the Court in Turner I explained that the problem with
the candidate's asserted right to reply in Tornillo was that it penal127
ized and might deter the speech that triggered the reply right.
The Court did not seem bothered that Turner I involved compelled
speech (and interpreted Tornillo as not making that fact crucial),
which would be fatal in the context of individual speakers. Thus, as
in other media access cases, the Court in Turner I approved compelled content that responds to predicted content failures of the
128
media order while not deterring or penalizing any other content.
This judicial approval, however, makes sense only if the relevant
constitutional concern in these media cases is with the functional
(i.e., marketplace of ideas) role of the media as opposed to a notion
of individual liberty.
Interestingly, the Court in Turner I implicitly accepted the
rationale that Justice Frankfurter made in dissent but that the
Court implicitly rejected in Barnette. 29 Frankfurter thought the
mandatory flag salute did not impair communicative freedom (or,
implicitly the marketplace of ideas) because the compelled student
and her parents remained free to express themselves about flags or

124. See, e.g., supra note 119 (citing authorities).
125. Cf. Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303b (1994) (mandating broadcast of
children's educational programming); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding reasonable
access of candidates to buy time to support candidacy); Report Concerning General Fairness
Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 (1985) (discussing fairness
doctrine's "coverage" prong mandating attention to important public issues).
126. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
127. 512 U.S. 622, 644, 653-55 (1994). Though the primary dissent thought that Tornillo applied because it concluded the law was content-based, it too thought that a true content-neutral
requirement that compelled speech would not generate a powerful First Amendment objection.
See id. at 684-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. See supra note 119 (citing authorities).
129. W.Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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flag saluting. 130 In contrast, the majority in Barnette invalidated
the compulsion due to its emphasis on the centrality of individual
liberty to the meaning of the First Amendment. My claim here is
that the Court's apparent contradictory holdings in Barnette and
Turner I got it right in both cases. Compulsion (or prohibition) is
impermissible as to the individual's freedom of speech (Barnette)
but sometimes permissible as a means to improve the overall communications environment in relation to a free press (Turner 1).
Since the cases involved no censorship, the Court could approve
compelled speech in the press context that would improperly impinge on individual liberty in the speech context.
The same distinctions can be applied in copyright, although
in one respect copyright differs from these media law examples of
permissible legislative intervention. Copyright allows the infringer's speech to be suppressed, not just mandated. (Even under
compulsory licensing, the copier must pay. For constitutional purposes-certainly for speech purposes-mandating payment to speak
is generally a form of suppression or censorship when based on content.) If suppression of expressive choices, whether by individuals
or media entities, is always properly viewed as impermissible censorship, all copyright should fall. However, this conclusion should
be resisted. The different rationales of the Speech and Press
Clauses justify a closer examination to determine whether the relevant freedom is actually restricted in each case.
Barring a person from saying what she chooses to say automatically interferes with speech liberty. Her peculiar choice of
words, even her choice to speak through the words of another, can
be the exercise of her expressive freedom. Press freedom, however,
protects the press's unimpeded, uncensored, opportunity to perform
its constitutionally based role: being an independent source of information and vision. Copyright is unconstitutionally inconsistent
with this role if either (1) it restricts the press's right to publish
facts or ideas or (2) it is directed at dampening the press's contribution to a robust public sphere. Copyright, however, is generally justified precisely in terms of enhancing, not dampening, media entities' capacity to perform their role. It supposedly leads to more and

130. According to Justice Frankfurter, '[ilt is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag involves the slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity ... to
disavow as publicly as they choose ... the meaning that others attach to the gesture of salute.
All channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents. Had we before
us any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon such free expression, I [would strike it
down]." Id. at 664 (Frankfurther, J., dissenting).
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higher quality provision of information and vision. If this contentbased rationale is plausible, the second problem is not raised.
Moreover, under deeply ingrained aspects of existing copyright law,
the first objection generally does not apply. It has long been understood that facts or ideas cannot be copyrighted. 131 The claim here is
that this limitation is not merely a policy decision that could be
changed legislatively but is constitutionally mandated, as are many
aspects of "fair use," including the automatic existence of fair use
when another's particular set of words is itself the "news"-the
132
relevant "fact."'
These limitations on copyright embodied in existing law, and
maybe others yet to be considered, respond to the same goal of a
robust and informative communications environment that lies behind the Press Clause's limitation on government power to abridge
press freedom. From the perspective of the rationale of the Press
Clause, beyond these constitutionally necessary but currently existing limits on copyright, copyright's restrictions on commercially
copying other people's expressive formulations generally pose no
constitutional problem. The constitutional value underlying the
Press Clause concerns the availability of facts and ideas, not particular entities getting to use their preferred (i.e., copied) expressive formulations. The prohibition on using someone else's words is
not inherently inconsistent with the press freely and effectively
serving its constitutional role of providing information or vision.
Thus, copyright's content-based suppression of copying particular
expressions is permissible in the media realm as long as copyright's
rules plausibly promote a more robust and independent press
sphere.
In sum, copyright is directly content-based-its application
turns on content, and it directly restricts some speakers' use of that
content. It is also content-based in its purpose-its goal is to stimulate creation and distribution of better, more professional, and
maybe more diverse content. Whether this content basis makes
copyright constitutionally objectionable is a different story. My
claim is that it does when applied to restrict an individual's noncommercial expressive activities. Here, copyright limits speech that

131. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); cf. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344
(1991) ("The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his
ideas or the facts he narrates.' " quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 556 (1985))).
132. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 563 (suggesting that President Ford's
characterization of the Nixon tapes as the "smoking gun" may be an expression necessary to fully
report the facts).
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the individual finds expressive-content that she wants to quote,
spread, and maybe endorse. The same limitation on copying or repeating in the media area has a different constitutional significance. Here, content discrimination is objectionable only to the extent that it interferes with the press's constitutional role. Even if
some copyright rules could do that-so far restrictions on facts and
ideas have been identified-a very plausible (hence constitutionally
permissible) legislative judgment is that copyright usually does not
interfere and sometimes may provide crucial support for the press's
constitutional role. 133 Thus, despite being a content-based suppression of infringers' speech, copyright as a form of media policy is
constitutionally authorized (under the Article I grant of power) and
134
can be constitutionally permissible (under the First Amendment).
VII. PRESS CLAUSE LIMITS ON COPYRIGHT
The Press Clause stands in opposition to any intellectual
property provision that predictably reduces the public availability
of different visions and factual accounts. On this ground, I endorsed
the widespread view that allowing the copyright of facts or ideas
would be unconstitutional. Given the usual centrist inclinations of
both lawmakers and, often, of market forces, constitutional review
should also find especially troublesome any tendency to reduce dissenting, marginal, or non-mainstream perspectives. Although an
attempt to provide a complete list and full analysis of possible Press
Clause limits on copyright is hardly plausible here, a brief discussion can illustrate the potential.

133. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 28, at 1899-1932.
134. The Court in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), made
common law distinctions very similar to those here asserted on the basis of First Amendment
theory, thereby intuitively supporting the wisdom of the constitutional approach developed in
this Essay. The Court repeatedly emphasized that the case did not involve any restriction on the
public copying and "spread[ing) ... of its contents gratuitously," but only involved rights as between commercial competitors. Id. at 239. Even Justice Brandeis's dissent concluded with the

observation that "the propriety of some remedy seems to be clear," implicitly agreeing that law
could properly regulate not just the news business but could limit newspapers' content choices
despite the general rule that intellectual productions should be "free as the air to common use."
Id. at 250, 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis's only substantial disagreement with
the majority, especially important given the particular historical context of the public's need for
vital war reports, was over whether a court or, as he thought, a legislature would more wisely
and legitimately formulate a remedy. Id. at 265-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Possibly the highest priority is to protect transformative
uses: an integration into a different expressive context that changes
or expands the meaning of the copyrighted expression. Uses as varied as becoming the organizing focus of a discussion, 135 a parody, or
an imaginative expansion on a presently copyrighted work are illustrative. 13 6 "Appropriation" for inclusion in expression alien to that
of the original can stimulate enormous opposition from "loyalists,"
as illustrated in a noncopyright context by the political storms over
various purported disrespectful "artistic" uses of various religious
symbols-crosses, Madonnas, and Christ figures. Similarly, in an
intellectual property colloquium, a major copyright scholar tried to
generate horror by imagining that copyright be interpreted to allow
an "infringer" to feature, without obtaining the predictably denied
permission, the popular fictional character, Harry Potter, in a tale
such as "Harry Potter: The Axe Murder."'137 On the contrary, such
culturally challenging transformations-"exploitations!"-are precisely what the First Amendment most clearly should protect.
(Properly interpreted, the Copyright Clause itself may not have authorized such legislative limitations on these uses.) The normative
principle is that authors should have the right to contribute to, not
exercise power over, cultural discourse and change.
Close cases may be found where the line is thin between
merely gaining economic benefit from the use of another's work and
using the work to create something new. Moreover, users typically
should have no right to benefit by fraudulently (of course, this term
represents the conclusion of the analysis) passing her product off as
that of another, e.g., the copyright. holder. In various contexts, the
Court has properly held that the First Amendment does not protect
"knowing falsehoods" that treat others instrumentally for the
speaker's own purposes. 138 This is what would be occurring in the
"passing off' context, at least if the purported infringer does or
should know that, even after viewing, hearing, or reading her as-

135. Cf. L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1705 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (rejecting
fair use claim).
136. The fact that there will be difficult cases of line drawing, which should reflect the normative content of the rationales and not mechanical tests, see Baker, supra note 52, at 114-27,
does not mean that there will not be important easy cases see, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (protecting Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone, a
transformative use of the novel Gone with the Wind).
137. Innovation Policy Colloquium, New York University Law School (Spring 2001).
138. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (characterizing "known lie as a
tool').
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serted transformation, people are likely to mistake it for the original author's work. 139 Still, the point of the Press Clause-protecting
the process of providing independent and diverse sources of information and vision-requires a constitutionally grounded (fair use)
privilege for broadly conceived category of transformative uses.
Especially if the Press Clause is thought to support either a
complex or liberal pluralist notion of democracy, 140 the First
Amendment should especially protect dissident or norm-challenging
uses of copyrighted materials.' 4' This consideration provides the
constitutionally required reason for an expansive reading of the
privilege to engage in transformative uses. 142 The privilege should
be read to prevent any stifling of diverse, especially dissenting or
non-mainstream, expression. These uses are also precisely the ones
for which many copyright holders, even for a payment, are least
likely to give consent. 143 Thus, both the rationale for and the need
for a privilege to ignore the author's copyright claim exists here at a
heightened level. Of course, since existing copyright law already
provides considerable fair use privileges for these transformative
and parodic uses, these observations are not too radical. Still, current law frequently rejects the claim. For example, the law holds
that copyright protects derivative products and exploitation of new
markets, 144 an arena where the Press Clause concerns may require
a retreat from these economically valuable but culturally limiting
rules. In sum, these constitutional considerations call for democ-

139. The opposite-false attributions--can also be forbidden. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int'l,
692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982).
140. BAKER, supra note 25 (discussing the implications of various theories of democracy for
the role of the press). The point is much less clear-cut from the perspective of elite democracy,
where virtually the only role of the Press Clause is to protect the press's capacity to serve as a
watchdog, or from a republican conception of democracy, which most fundamentally seeks common ground. Id. at 125-213.
141. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (1999).
142. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that commercial parody of Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman may constitute fair use). But cf. SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (preliminarily enjoining publication
of The Wind Done Gone, an asserted parody of Gone with the Wind), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th
Cir. 2001) (finding that the preliminary injunction violated the First Amendment).
143. This was precisely the situation with respect to Gone with the Wind, and Judge Marcus
identified that fact as one of the evils that fair use should be employed to prevent. SunTrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring); see also Madow, supra note 60, at 144 (illustrating this theme with the case of the estate of
John Wayne refusing to allow the use of an image of John Wayne wearing lipstick on a greeting
card with an inscription saying "It's a bitch being butch," and objecting to the existence of legal
power to suppress a "semiotic democracy").
144. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994) (granting creator a right over derivative works).
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changes in the law.
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B. Unpublished Materials
A long-running dispute, recently encouraged by language in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,146 concerns
third parties' publication of content that liberally quotes unpublished materials. The consequence of recognizing copyright protection here could seriously impair historically and politically significant uses of an author's writings. 47 If copyright protection could
avoid seriously restricting the media's opportunity to publish this
content while simultaneously protecting potential authors in a
manner designed to encourage them to publish, copyright would
serve the constitutionally based purposes of both the Copyright
Clause and the Press Clause. These dual objectives would possibly
mean attempts to "scoop" an author's imminent publication merit
little legal sympathy. 148 However, any purported right of an author
to determine when, and especially, whether to publish interferes
directly with the press's role of providing information. Such a right
should be rejected on First Amendment grounds.
Although denial of the author's right may seem to conflict
with respect for privacy, the issue here does not involve compelling
an author to hand over or otherwise disclose her private writings.

145. This may understate the change called for with respect to freeing up new creators to engage in behavior that presently constitute derivative works. Interestingly, this may be the area
where the routine interests of individual content creators and the larger corporate entities which
end up holding most copyrights that are exploited in making derivative works most typically
diverge-with even commercially oriented, corporately employed creative or artistic personnel
regularly engaged in "borrowings" or appropriations that can be seen as making derivative
works. Less copyright protection is likely to have both desirable distributive and desirable cultural, pro-creative consequences-although my constitutional argument does not depend on
these empirical predictions. Cf. Madow, supra note 60 (making similar predictions about the
consequences of rejecting any legally protected right of publicity).
146. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). The Court emphasized that "fair use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works" and at common law the author's right in a work was absolute until he voluntarily parted with it. Id. at 55051.
147. Cf. New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989); Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987). Congress's subsequent amendment of law
may reduce but not eliminate the problem generated by the Harper & Row Publishers dicta. See
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (setting forth 1992 amendment stating that a finding of fair use is not
barred by the fact that a work is unpublished).
148. Because the decision in Harper & Row Publishers involved multiple issues, this point
about protecting against unfair scoops may be insufficient to justify the Court's holding to doubters (like myself). The point may, however, provide the best argument for the majority result and
suggests an appropriate basis for limiting the decision.
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Rather, the issue is: Can the original author control further dissemination once her expression is already known by another? The
immediate observation is that privacy protection is not a basis for
Congress's power under the Copyright Clause, which instead is only
intended to increase the information available to society. Of course,
the greater security to authors that a privacy-oriented copyright
rule would provide might increase people's willingness to fix their
intimate thoughts to a tangible medium and eventually to make
them available. In any event, protecting privacy is a high-sounding
goal. Someone might think that surely the government should be
permitted to use copyright to serve it. The trouble is that the First
Amendment limits the means by which privacy can be protected
just as it limits the ways an author's economic interests can be advanced. The state should (and does) provide privacy with many legal protections. It restricts trespass by strangers, including the
press, into a person's home; it prohibits theft of manuscripts; and it
restricts tapping into a person's wired or wireless electronic communications. 149 The state, however, should not protect privacy by
means that directly restrict the media's right to publish what they
choose and individuals to say what they want. 150 As currently understood, the First Amendment severely restricts carving out a
broad realm of private information or private content that others
cannot communicate. 15 1 Copyright protection for unpublished materials would do precisely that.
From a First Amendment perspective, the question is
whether the law.can give a person a right to stop publication as a
means of honoring or protecting a person's interest in privacy. The
answer is "no". Often the First Amendment even disallows legal

149. The constitutionality of applying these laws to restrict reporters and thereby the press
is not particularly controversial. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1999). Rather,
without questioning the basic legal protection of private space, what is controversial is whether
someone not a party to the invasion of privacy can be prohibited from publishing information
that was originally obtained through the tort or crime, see, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001), or whether damages for the wrongdoing can cover the injury due to publication and
spread of the illegally obtained information, see, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
194 F.3d 505, 522-24 (4th Cir. 1999).
150. C. Edwin Baker, Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
151. In upholding a First Amendment claim in a case where a newspaper violated state law
by identifying by name the victim of a sexual assault, Justice Marshall cautioned that "although
our decisions have without exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have emphasized each
time that we were resolving this conflict [between a free press and personal privacy] only as it
arose in a discrete factual context." Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (emphasis
added). See generally Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis'sPrivacy Test, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
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prohibitions on publishing information that was originally obtained
through illegal activity. 15 2 Similarly, allowing a copyright holder to
stop publication of unpublished material is suppression of information. This restraint is presumptively inconsistent with the Press
Clause. A person's freedom not to speak or write or disclose protects
her original control. Once the press has the knowledge, however,
the government should not censor what it can print. 153 Of course,
the Press Clause-based First Amendment right might typically be
satisfied by copyright's fact/expression distinction. The constitutional interest is sufficiently served if the press is able to summarize the illegally taped or the copyrighted material. However, when
the unique expression is itself "news" or historically or culturally
valuable content, the constitutional right must extend further. 54
More generally, the policy values that underlie the Press Clause
further explain why the fair use presumption should be especially
strong, not especially weak, in situations where the author has not
published and not indicated any plans to do so. The infringer is
likely to be the only party willing to bring the expression before the
public in a timely fashion.
C. Remedies
The Press Clause also arguably limits the way the government designs the remedies portion of the copyright system. Go back
to the rationale for recognizing copyrights. These rights add to the
economic incentives purportedly needed to get some authors to create and publishers to distribute valuable expression. At bottom, the
copyright system is justified as media-promoting legislation. Underlying copyright rules perfectly designed for these purposes would

152. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514 (finding, in the limited circumstances of the case, that the
wiretap law's prohibition on publishing contents of illegally recorded conversations violated the
First Amendment); cf. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Nebraska Press, a
majority of the Court may have agreed with Justice Brennan that it is always unconstitutional
for a state to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial by means of prohibiting publication of
information, "no matter how shabby the means by which the information is obtained." Neb. Press
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., concurring); see id. at 570-71
(White, J., concurring); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). Another case, Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), is clearly distinguishable from both cases because the press knowingly
and purposefully agreed to the restriction on publication.
153. See, e.g., Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding that
state's interest in maintaining confidentiality of information regarding proceedings of Judicial
Inquiry and Review Commission justifies nondisclosure and secrecy but prohibiting "strangers"
to the proceeding from divulging or publishing the information violates First Amendment).
154. This point might help justify the narrowness of the decision in Bartnicki, where the
Court did not reach the issue of whether the law could constitutionally protect less newsworthy
expression. 532 U.S. at 533.
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leave little cause for constitutional concern about the particular
scheme chosen for their enforcement. The logic of a full protection
theory of the First Amendment requires a determination of whether
a substantive rule does or does not restrict speech in violation of
the First Amendment. The Court has never suggested, for example,
that First Amendment rights are differentially offended by criminal
and civil penalties; either there is a right that can be offended by
either penalty or there is no right so either can be applied. 155 Inevitably, however, mistakes in legal crafting of or applying copyright
rules will occur. Some mistakes will grant too much control to the
author-owner. A court might defer too readily to legislative bodies,
especially on more fact-based policy judgments. Or a court, like an
apparently well-intended but poorly calculating legislature, might
itself err in not constitutionally overriding the copyright grant. No
degree of legislative integrity or judicial interpretive care can do
away with this potential for "constitutional" error.
The loss due to constitutional error would be reduced if the
law did not allow copyright owners entirely to block apparently illegal, transgressive "copying." For this reason, any transgressor
should be able to copy in order to engage in her preferred expression as long as she pays the copyright holder for his economic loss,
including any compensation necessary to cover the gain he could
have reasonably hoped to receive by delaying publication. Not only
does this principle rule out damages based on the copier's purported
unjust enrichment, 156 or based on values unrelated to the legitimate
purposes of copyright, such as damages for lost privacy. More importantly, this principle rules out injunctions as long as payment is
made. Note, however, that this argument does not rule out injunctions entirely. An injunction lasting until the transgressor demonstrates a capacity and willingness to pay might be permissible.
Without engaging in a full discussion, it is also clear that this argument does not rule out all temporary injunctions during a short

155. This may be an overstatement to the extent that the Justices indicate a willingness to
engage in legislative-like balancing. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). My claim, however, applies within a full protection theory and is well illustrated by Justice Brennan's dissent in Gertz. 418 U.S. at 361-69 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
156. A recovery for unjust enrichment is inconsistent with the view that the copier serves the
public by making the material available and serves it well to the extent that she makes the content more effectively-potentially more profitably-available than the copyright owner would
have.
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period in which the parties' respective rights are worked out. 157
Still, a permanent injunction clearly would be impermissible, as
would any injunction applicable after the infringer credibly offers to
pay damages. Essentially, this approach amounts to a constitutionally mandated, judicially determined license fee. After reliable evidence of a willingness to pay the "fee," further resistance by a copyright owner to the copier's use suggests reasons other than receiving the economic incentive which justifies copyright as media policy. These reasons include privacy, maintaining or gaining political
power, and preserving possibly undeserved reputation. These reasons, however, even though generally worthy of respect, are not
permissible bases for restricting the press's freedom to make publication decisions.
D. Interpretative Stance
A final observation concerns the appropriate judicial predisposition in approaching copyright issues-either their interpretative orientation toward claims of fair use and other matters of
statutory reach or their general attitude toward constitutional challenges to copyright rules. Earlier I noted reasons for constitutional
courts to give legislative branches considerable deference regarding
structural media policy. I admitted that much depends on the particular theory of democracy that is considered appropriate. 158 Elite
democracy combined with a generalized faith in the market leads to
general policy opposition to and constitutional presumptions
against media-specific, legislative interventions-and the same
might follow for republican democrats. Liberal pluralists, concerned
with how the market predictably underserves diversity in the media field, often would favor and, arguably, sometimes would mandate governmental interventions. Complex democracy requires both
media that both serves republican democracy's goal of a unified,
society-wide discourse and also, as the liberal pluralists emphasize,
media that serve the discourse, organization, and activist needs of
segmented groups. Determining which discourse is, or whether neither or both are, underserved is a complicated, contextual matter.

157. Cf. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (holding that the First Amendment requires procedural protections on government restrictions of rallies or meetings); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding that severe procedural limitations, including requirement of speedy decision, are constitutionally required before prior restraints can be used
during the process of determining if a movie is obscene).
158. For a discussion of these claims about different theories of democracy and support for
complex democracy, see BAKER, supra note 25, at 125-213.
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To allow appropriate policy responses, a complex democrat should
normally avoid a heavy-handed constitutional stance in favor of allowing legislative choice among a wide range of plausible policy options.
With the exception of elitist democracy, all these theories of
democracy purport to favor popular democratic participation. They
divide over the type of professional media that participatory democracy requires. However, this framing of the disagreement ignores a
second divide: the relation, in a properly functioning democracy, of
professional to more voluntaristic communication structures. Both
are clearly vital for democracy. Still, the question can always be
posed whether the market and legal order inadequately nourishes
or disadvantages, one or the other of these communication spheresthe professional or the voluntarist-or, on the other hand, whether
one sphere is unnecessarily and inappropriately given dominance.
The Speech Clause discussed in the first part of this Essay, arguing
for a virtually complete exemption of nonmarket oriented speech
from copyright restraint, partly responds to the need to protect the
voluntarist side of democratic communications. This realm can include the popular or nonprofessional publicists and the free-lance or
occasional market participant. Nevertheless, media policy in general and copyright law in particular inevitably influence the comparative robustness and the competitive advantages of these two
sorts of communication. The appropriate judicial predisposition to
claims advantaging one or the other sphere might turn on whether
special reasons exist for worrying about the legislative resolution.
An institutional argument has possible relevance here. Increases in the scope of copyright protection will predictably most
advantage centralized, conglomerate media enterprises and their
communications, while most likely disadvantaging nonmarketoriented participants in the communication order. 159 Although democratic dependence on a professional press certainly justifies giving these economic entities' needs some focused legal protection,
often these protections have little negative impact on free-lance authors or nonprofessional communications. Shield law legislation
protecting reporters' confidential relation with their sources, press
galleries, and provision of press facilities at government headquarters serve as legislative examples. In contrast, copyright policy of-

159. Benkler, supra note 67, at 401-12. Not just this point, but more generally much of the
analysis in the current discussion owes a large debt to Benkler.
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ten favors one and disfavors the other of these domains of democratic communication.
Dispersed, unorganized, and often financially marginal lay
speakers are the mainstay of the participatory side. These characteristics mean that these speakers are unlikely to represent themselves effectively in the legislative process. At best, noncommercial
communicators and democratic participants might hope to have
their case presented by occasional spokespersons based in the academic community or in activist nonprofit public interest organizations. On the other hand, market-based media have more professional and enterprise-based organizational resources, greater
wealth, and clearer incentives that provide the foundation for extensive and effective lobbying. Given that persuasive materials
aimed at public opinion are these organizations' product, the politicians and public officials who depend upon favorable public opinion
are especially unlikely to cross the lobbying efforts of these enterprises (except when the professional and enterprise organizations
are internally divided). Thus, an obvious structurally based prediction is that legislators will be much more attuned to hearing and
accepting democratic claims favoring greater copyright enclosures
than those democratic claims favoring less enclosure. 160 The evidence amply supports this prediction. The country has experienced
a continual historical process of a copyright extension to encompass
an increasing enclosure of the public domain of expressive content.
This history arguably illustrates the public's weakness and the
commercial media and publishing industry's strength in the legislative arena, at least in the copyright context. That is, the nonprofessional participatory speakers in democratic discourse are predictably, observably, and systematically disadvantaged when in policy
level competition, as they often are in the copyright arena, with
professional participants.
Media enterprises' challenges to structural or economic media regulations always involve situations where their interests already have been strongly advanced in the legislative arena. They
are seeking a second bite. This fact cautions restraint by courts in
evaluating media enterprises' challenges to structural regulations.
Such regulations-"must-carry rules" and "speaker access rules"
and concentration rules are examples-not only purport to embody
the legislators' best vision of more democratic communications, but

160. Benkler credits David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147 (1981), with first identifying this enclosure problem. Benkler, supra note 67, at 354
n.2.
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also the media entities will have already forcibly presented their
opposing view as to the best vision within the policy discussion. A
deferential orientation toward legislative judgments seems appropriate here.
Alleged infringers' challenges to the scope of copyright present a systematically different context. The losing side in the legislative decision to approve copyright "enclosures" often is not represented by well-organized, financially and politically powerful advocates. Observers commonly report the public was largely excluded
from the bargaining table. 16 1 Thus, a large portion of those disadvantaged by any challenged copyright enclosure will be precisely
those who, on the one hand, are not well-represented legislatively
but who, on the other hand, are key participants in democracy. The
courts may be the main realm in which their participatory claims
can be effectively heard and advanced.
Generally, the demise of Lochner 62 involves acceptance of
the view that the likelihood of rent seeking and the existence of unequal political advantage do not justify constitutional suspicion of
economic legislation. However, in challenges to copyright "enclosures," the interests that are systematically disadvantaged in the
legislative context are often constitutionally valued participatory
democratic interests. Of course, these democratic interests lie on
both sides. The ultimately central participants-citizens-must rely
to a degree on the professionals. 163 Therefore, the best policy results
cannot be identified definitionally with those that favor participatory or voluntarist communicators over professionals. Nevertheless,
the inevitable tilt of the legislative process can justify a degree of
independent judicial appraisal of copyright enclosures that is inappropriate either in other media policy contexts or in nonmedia contexts. Essentially, the same judicial responsiveness to the democratic needs of engaged citizenry that justifies a presumption of validity to noncensorious media structural regulations justifies a
much more skeptical constitutional and interpretive attitude in the
copyright arena.

161. See LITMAN, supra note 68.
162. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
163. The degree of necessary reliance is disputed-depending upon on the interaction of
technology and how its use is economically and legally structured, the degree of valuable or necessary reliance may change. This observation reinforces arguments for independent judicial
review of legislative settlements that predictably favor rules that help maintain reliance on

commodified information.
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CONCLUSION

The tension between copyright and the First Amendment has
long been noted. It might turn out that giving full force to First
Amendment principles would be too destructive of the proper aims
of copyright to be acceptable. If so, it would then be time to consider
appropriate accommodations. The need for accommodation, however, should not be merely assumed from the start. Thus, this Essay examines the question of what giving full force to the First
Amendment would mean for copyright.
Understanding the implications of the First Amendment for
copyright requires an understanding of the First Amendment. Arguably the best interpretation, which elsewhere I defend both descriptively and normatively, sees protection of individual liberty at
the heart of the Speech Clause and protection of democratic communications structures at the heart of the Press Clause. Relying on
this constitutional understanding, this Essay argues that copyright
generally cannot be applied to limit noncommercial copying. Although dramatic constitutionally, this conclusion turns out to be
much less radical in practice. Historically, the main concern of
copyright involved contexts where copies would be sold or otherwise
used for commercial purposes-although as time has passed, copyright owners' often successful efforts to restrict noncommercial use
or copying have increased. In contrast, given doctrines such as denial of copyright protection for facts or ideas and related provisions
for fair use, most copyright restrictions on commercial copying are
constitutionally acceptable forms of media policy. Thus, the Essay
concludes that many but not all elements of existing copyright law
are perfectly acceptable from a First Amendment perspective-just
as most other structural media regulations are constitutionally acceptable.
Of course, the conclusion that much of copyright is constitutional does not mean that copyright "enclosures" are wise. Just as is
true about societal decisions concerning the establishment of public
parks, regulation of "smoke stack" industries, or public education,
the policy choices about the communications environment can be
wise or unwise. They make for one or another form of community.
Seldom does the Constitution mandate a particular choice. Still, the
First Amendment matters. Copyright legislation that restricts an
individual's expressive choices and copyright rules that limit the
media's capacity to perform the democratic roles of a free press
should be found unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
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